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Abstract:  While industry expertise has been identified as a method of differentiation 
among audit firms to signal their skills and capabilities within particular 
industries, it is not known whether the length of time that an auditor has been 
an industry specialist is associated with the quality and pricing of the services 
that it provides. I construct several measures of prior industry experience to 
examine these associations. I find evidence that prior industry experience 
measures at the national level are more strongly associated with audit quality 
than industry specialization measures. I also find evidence that prior industry 
experience at the national level is associated with the level of audit fees 
charged. However, the direction of this association varies depending on 
whether an auditor is an industry expert by virtue of being an industry leader 
(market share) or having clients within an industry comprise a significant 
volume of its audit volume (portfolio share). At the city level, I do not find a 
significant association between audit quality and prior industry experience; 
suggesting that prior industry experience is more relevant at the national level. 
However, I do find evidence that prior industry experience at the city level is 
associated with an audit fee premium. This result may indicate that industry 
clients are willing to pay higher audit fees based on an auditor’s duration of 
industry experience, despite there being little evidence that these auditors 
provide higher quality audit services. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to examine whether auditors’ prior industry experience is 
associated with current period audit quality and fees. In previous industry specialization studies, 
an auditor’s industry expertise is measured using its current period market or portfolio shares 
within an industry. However, if an auditor’s industry expertise is a function of experience gained 
in the current year plus experience gained from prior years working within the same industry, 
then traditional measures of auditor industry specialization are missing a critical element of 
overall auditor expertise. To examine this, I construct measures of industry specialization that 
incorporate auditors’ prior industry experience and test how these measures are associated with 
current period audit quality and fees. I also examine whether the association between auditors’ 
prior industry experience and current period audit quality and fees varies by industry 
characteristics. 
Starting in the early 1990’s, accounting firms made concerted efforts to align their business 
models along industry lines. KPMG was the first of the large accounting firms to adopt this 
business model (Greene and Barrett 1994). Each of the major accounting firms followed KPMG’s 
lead by promoting specific areas of expertise within their audit offerings (Public Accounting 
Report 1995). Since then, audit firms have focused on providing greater levels of industry-
specific expertise within their self-professed set of industry competencies. This lead to  
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concentration within the audit market and a framework where a few audit firms in each industry 
possess superior industry-specific knowledge (Hogan and Jeter 1999). 
Coinciding with audit firms’ focus on industry specialization, accounting research in this area 
proliferated over the past 20 years (Habib 2011). Early research in this area indicates that larger 
auditors are more experienced and provide higher quality audits (DeAngelo 1981a). Over time, 
accounting researchers examined auditors’ industry specialization as a means for larger auditors – 
particularly national and international accounting firms – to differentiate themselves and their 
service offerings from their peers (Palmrose 1986; Craswell et al. 1995; Kwon 1996; Mayhew 
and Wilkins 2003; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Research on auditors’ industry specialization as a 
differentiation strategy suggests auditors designated within the literature as “industry specialists” 
receive higher audit fees and deliver higher quality audits than non-specialists (Gramling and 
Stone 2001; Habib 2011; DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
Despite the general consensus within the literature regarding the association between industry 
specialization and audit quality and fees, studies within the auditor industry specialization 
literature vary in how they measure auditors’ industry expertise. Prior studies in this area measure 
industry expertise using total client assets (Behn et al. 2008; Minutti-Meza 2013), total client 
sales (Dunn and Mayhew 2004; Huang et al. 2007), number of clients within an industry 
(Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Balsam et al. 2003), and total audit fees charged within an industry 
(Reichelt and Wang 2010; Numan and Willekens 2012). Additionally, prior studies vary 
regarding whether industry specialization is a market share phenomenon or a within-firm, or 
portfolio, phenomenon (Gramling and Stone 2001; Krishnan 2001).  
In addition to the various measurement approaches, recent research questions whether the 
measures used in prior studies are appropriate proxies for the construct of industry expertise. One 
issue raised is whether current industry specialization proxies measure industry dominance – 
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exemplified by an industry specialist that audits a few very large clients within an industry – or 
economies of scale – exemplified by an industry specialist that audits a large number of smaller 
clients within an industry (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 2012; Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013). 
Additionally, there is a question of whether traditional measures of industry specialization are 
correctly specified (Minutti-Meza 2013). While the efforts of accounting firms to consolidate 
their industry-specific knowledge are apparent (Hogan and Jeter 1999), the issue of whether 
current empirical proxies for industry specialization are valid still lingers. 
A recent working paper by Gaver and Utke (2014) begins to address these concerns by employing 
a piecewise regression to differentiate between “seasoned” industry specialists (auditors who 
have been industry specialists for more than one year) and “unseasoned” industry specialists 
(auditors who are first-year industry experts). Their results suggest that seasoned industry 
specialists provide higher audit quality than non-specialists, but their results indicate no 
significant difference between unseasoned industry specialists and non-specialists. Despite the 
assertion that industry expertise remains relatively stable over time (Cahan et al. 2011; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014), the findings of Gaver and Utke (2014) indicate that auditors with more years of 
industry specialization experience provide higher quality audits than first-year industry specialist 
auditors. These results suggest a temporal aspect of audit industry specialization that has not been 
previously explored within the literature.1  Relying on learning curve theory from the 
management sciences and auditor tenure literature (Abernathy and Wayne 1974; Adler and Clark 
1991; Brooks et al. 2011), my study further explores this temporal aspect by measuring auditor 
industry specialization based on the total number of years the auditor has been an industry expert. 
Consistent with these studies, I expect auditors to conduct higher quality audits and receive 
                                                           
1
 In an earlier study, Krishnan (2003) measures auditor industry specialization using aggregate market share 
and portfolio proportions of total client sales within industry across a ten-year period (1989-1998). 
However, Krishnan’s measure was not largely utilized in subsequent research; and industry specialization 
remains viewed as a contemporaneous rather than aggregate measure. 
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greater audit fee premiums the longer they are identified as industry specialists within a particular 
industry. 
As the theory’s name suggests, however, the learning curve carries with it an inherent assumption 
of decreasing returns on experience over time. Prior learning curve literature suggests that these 
decreasing returns may result from complacency or lack of innovation over time (Abernathy and 
Wayne 1974), which stems from increased client familiarity (Yelle 1979) or bonding (Brooks et 
al. 2011). Consistent with auditor tenure research (Johnson et al. 2002; Gul et al. 2009), it is 
possible that over a long enough time frame, industry experience results in negative benefits to 
the firm and auditor. Therefore, it is important to determine if there is a point in time where an 
industry specialist provides the greatest level of expertise with respect to audit quality. My study 
explores this non-linear aspect of auditor industry specialization using a quadratic model to 
establish if and when audit quality is maximized with respect to prior industry expertise. 
Finally, my study examines how the benefits of prior industry expertise vary across different 
industries. Prior research finds that the levels of audit quality provided and audit fees charged by 
industry specialist auditors vary according to the concentration of auditors and clients within an 
industry (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Cahan et al. 2011), the operating similarities between 
firms in the industry (Cairney and Young 2006; Bills et al. 2015), and the complexity of 
accounting in the industry (Francis et al. 2013; Bills et al. 2015). If the costs and benefits of 
auditor industry specialization change with the nature of an industry, it is also possible that the 
costs and benefits of prior industry experience may change as well. It is not immediately obvious 
whether the associations observed in industry specialization research will be strengthened or 
attenuated with regard to prior industry experience since the effects of auditors’ long-term 
exposure to a particular industry have not been directly examined in prior research.  
5 
 
To develop working measures of prior industry experience, I begin with established audit industry 
specialization measures from previous research. I measure audit industry specialization based on 
auditors' market and portfolio shares both the national and city level. For the market share 
measure of industry specialization, an auditor is considered to be a national (city) industry 
specialist if its annual market share is at least 30% (50%) of the national (city) market in its two-
digit SIC category (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Minutti-Meza 2013).  For the portfolio share 
measure of industry specialization, an auditor is considered to be a national (city) industry 
specialist if its annual share in a two-digit SIC category is one of the top three for the auditor 
across all industries in its portfolio (Krishnan 2003; Knechel et al. 2007).  My measure of prior 
industry experience is the number of consecutive years that an auditor has been a market leader or 
a portfolio leader at the national (city) level.  
When examining industry expertise at the national level, I find evidence that prior industry 
experience is more strongly associated with audit quality than industry specialization. The 
association between audit quality and prior industry experience continues to remain positive and 
significant after controlling for current period industry specialization. I also find mixed evidence 
that prior industry experience influences the level of audit quality across different types of 
industries. At the city level, I find no evidence that audit quality is associated with prior industry 
experience. While industry specialization is positive and significantly associated with audit 
quality, prior industry experience is insignificant in all of the tests of my primary hypothesis. I 
also do not find much support for my secondary hypotheses regarding audit quality across 
different types of industry, suggesting that prior industry experience may only be relevant to audit 
quality at the national level.  
With regard to audit pricing, I find evidence that prior industry experience is associated with the 
level of audit fees. The initial direction of the association between audit fees and prior industry 
experience changes depending on whether a market share measure or portfolio share measure is 
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used. However, both measures are consistent in the finding that audit fees appear to be decreasing 
in the duration of prior industry experience. I also find strong overall evidence that the association 
between audit fees and industry characteristics varies with the level of prior industry experience. 
At the city level, I find evidence that prior industry experience is associated with higher audit 
fees. While none of the tests on industry characteristics yield significant results, the association 
between audit fees and prior industry experience is positive and significant in all of my city level 
regressions. This result may indicate that auditors with prior industry experience at the city level 
can demand an audit fee premium despite a lack of any evidence that prior industry experience 
improves the quality of audit services provided. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, my research provides new 
insight regarding the measurement of auditor industry expertise. Several prior studies utilize 
multiple measures of industry specialization within their analyses to provide robustness to their 
results (Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Balsam et al. 2003; Goodwin and Wu 2013). However, there 
are still questions as to whether these studies effectively represent the construct of industry 
expertise (Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013; Minutti-Meza 2013). A measure of prior industry 
experience may provide a more detailed means of evaluating the accumulation of industry 
knowledge. Moreover, Gaver and Utke (2014) provide preliminary evidence that a time-series 
analysis of industry expertise alleviates some of the econometric concerns raised by prior studies 
(Minutti-Meza 2013). My study extends and expands upon Gaver and Utke’s findings by looking 
at prior industry experience as a continuous measure rather than as a piecewise regression on 
experienced and inexperienced industry specialists. A major advantage of this approach is that it 
allows me to evaluate auditor industry expertise over several points in time. If there are 
decreasing returns on industry experience, it is feasible that audit quality could be decreasing in 
industry experience in the long-term. Assuming that this is the case, my model can also estimate 
the point in time that industry expertise is maximized with respect to audit quality. 
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Second, my research expands upon the existing literature examining the association between 
auditor industry specialization and audit quality. In general, research in this area suggests that 
there is a positive relation between industry specialization and audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003; 
Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010). Prior studies suggest that large auditors (i.e. Big N 
auditors) provide higher levels of audit quality for industry lines that they specialize in (Gul et al. 
2009). While the association between industry expertise and audit quality is not as pronounced 
for smaller audit firms, there is still an observed positive association (Basioudis and Francis 
2007). My study provides more detail regarding this association; particularly as to how the 
accumulation of industry experience is associated with audit quality. 
Third, my research extends the literature that examines audit fees charged by industry specialist 
auditors. There has been a great deal of research in this area, and much of it is inconsistent 
(Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013). Several studies identify an audit fee premium when clients 
employ industry specialist auditors (Huang et al. 2007; Numan and Willekens 2012; Zerni 2012). 
Other studies, however, present contradictory findings where the use of industry specialist 
auditors does not result in a fee premium (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Ferguson and Stokes 
2002); or even appears to be associated with reductions in audit fees (Deis and Giroux 1996; Bills 
et al. 2015). While several recent studies attempt to determine the reasons for the inconsistencies 
in prior research (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 2012; Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013), it is worth 
noting that prior studies have not examined audit fees in the context of prior industry experience. 
My study fills this void in the literature and provides additional evidence regarding how auditors’ 
industry competencies are associated with the fees that they charge. 
Finally, this study provides a new view of how differences across industries may play a role in the 
level of audit quality that auditors provide and their audit pricing decisions. Just as industries vary 
with the nature of the goods and services that firms provide, they also vary with respect to 
auditor-client composition (Cahan et al. 2011), industry homogeneity of firms (Cairney and 
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Young 2006), and the nature of the accounting guidelines (Francis et al. 2013). If the quality and 
pricing of services are associated with industry characteristics, then it stands to reason that these 
associations may vary based on the level of prior industry experience of auditors within these 
industries. I examine several measures from previous industry specialization studies to determine 
how audit quality and fees across different types of industries varies based on the prior industry 
experience of the auditor. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the prior research in this 
area. Chapter III presents and develops my hypotheses. Chapter IV describes my sample selection 
and research methodology. Chapter V presents the results and Chapter VI concludes the paper. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
1 Measurement of Auditor Industry Specialization 
According to Gramling and Stone (2001), audit industry specialization research focuses on how 
auditors utilize their position within a particular market to provide superior services to their 
clients and negotiate fees based on the nature of the services that they provide. A majority of 
industry specialization research examines how large auditors (i.e. Big N auditors) differentiate 
themselves from one another based on the market share that each possesses within a given 
industry (DeFond and Zhang 2014).2   This literature traditionally defines industry specialists as 
audit firms that are market leaders in an industry for a given year (Balsam et al. 2003). However, 
there is variation within the literature regarding how to best measure industry specialization, as 
well as concerns regarding the current measurement approaches. 
One concern with using market leadership as the criterion for industry expertise is that it 
generally excludes smaller audit firms. Since the majority of large clients are audited by large 
auditors, it is usually only these large auditors that are ever viewed as market leaders within an 
industry (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Additionally, market leadership may not reflect the industry 
                                                           
2
 More recent studies, particularly those that examine industry specialization at the city or partner level, 
examine market shares of all firms within a given industry rather than just the Big 4. While the Big 4 are 
still market leaders in most industries worldwide, a few studies have found non-Big 4 firms with substantial 
market shares. For example, Basioudis and Francis (2007) noted that the market leaders in three of the 
sixteen industries that they examined were non-Big 4 accounting firms. 
10 
 
preferences of the audit firms themselves. Krishnan (2001) finds that auditors’ self-reported 
industry specializations frequently do not correlate with their market shares. While the literature 
often assumes that market leaders are industry specialists, it appears that this definition is limited 
and may not reflect the self-professed industry specializations of these auditors. 
To partially address this concern, more recent studies use a portfolio measure to quantify industry 
expertise. Rather than evaluating industry knowledge on the basis of market share, the portfolio 
approach assesses industry expertise based on the proportion a particular industry represents of 
the auditor’s entire portfolio (Yardley et al. 1992). The portfolio approach tends to mediate the 
issue of large auditor dominance and correlates more closely with auditors’ self-reported industry 
specializations (Krishnan 2001). While the portfolio approach has not been widely used as a 
primary measure of industry expertise, it is often used as a joint or follow-up measure to the 
market share approach.3 
Audit industry specialization studies also differ in the metric used to measure market or portfolio 
shares. Early studies in this area rely on total client assets (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Kwon 
1996; Hogan and Jeter 1999), total client sales (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Menon and 
Williams 2001; Casterella et al. 2004), and/or number of clients audited (Deis and Giroux 1996; 
Chin and Chi 2009) by an auditor within an industry. However, each of these measures is 
considered to be a proxy for total audit fees (Cairney and Young 2006; Knechel et al. 2007), since 
audit fee data was not widely available in the United States until 2000. A few international 
studies were able to take advantage of audit fee disclosures in foreign countries such as Australia 
(Craswell et al. 1995), Hong Kong (DeFond et al. 2000), and Great Britain (Basioudis and 
Francis 2007). While most recent studies utilize audit fees as the metric for measuring industry 
                                                           
3
 In an effort to capture the effects of both the market share and portfolio measures, Neal and Riley (2004) 
proposed a weighted market share approach that incorporates cut-off values from both measures to capture 
the effects of both approaches. Neal and Riley’s measure has seen limited use in subsequent industry 
specialization studies; such as in Cahan et al. 2013. 
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specialization (Fung et al. 2012; Bills et al. 2015; Krishnan et al. 2013), a few recent studies still 
utilize other market and portfolio share metrics (Zerni 2012; Minutti-Meza 2013).4 
Another area of contention in industry specialization research is the determination of the level of 
industry expertise. The most common designation used in the literature is an indicator variable for 
the market leader(s) of a particular industry. Palmrose (1986) defines industry expert as the top 
three auditors within an industry based on market share.5   Other studies set a market share 
proportion as the threshold for the industry specialist designation. Craswell et al. (1995) define 
industry expert as audit firms with at least a 10% market share within an industry. More recent 
studies include proportional market or portfolio shares as continuous measures of industry 
expertise. In addition to testing industry specialization using market leader and threshold 
indicators similar to those used in prior studies, Balsam et al. (2003) also examine industry 
expertise as a continuous percentage of market share within an industry based on sales, as well as 
the number of clients audited by the an auditor within a particular industry. 
Yet another issue with the measurement of auditor industry specialization lies in geographic 
specificity. Early studies measure auditor industry expertise almost exclusively at a national level 
(Palmrose 1986; Craswell et al. 1995; Hogan and Jeter 1999). However, Ferguson et al. (2003) 
find that national industry expertise only appears to be relevant when a firm is also a city industry 
leader. In a subsequent study, Francis and Yu (2009) find that industry specialization appears to 
be a function of local office (i.e. city) expertise rather than national expertise. However, the 
results in Carson (2009) also suggest that global-level expertise can influence audit fee premiums. 
Several recent studies expand upon these findings by drilling down to the partner level and note 
                                                           
4
 Several recent studies (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 2012; Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013) consider audit 
fees and number of clients jointly in an effort to resolve the issue of audit fee reductions due to economies 
of scale than some auditors obtain by auditing several clients within the same industry. 
5
 Palmrose notes that the market leader designation is only applicable when there is a readily observable 
difference compared to other auditors. For example Palmrose designates PriceWaterhouse as an industry 
specialist in the Beverages – Liquor industry with a 59% market share. However, no other audit firms were 
designated as specialists because their market shares were not substantially different from one another. 
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that some industry competencies may be driven by partner expertise (Chin and Chi 2009; Zerni 
2012; Goodwin and Wu 2013).  
One final issue with regard to the measurement of auditor industry specialization is whether 
traditional measures adequately proxy for industry expertise. While there are several established 
measures for industry specialization in the accounting literature, little research has been done to 
determine if these measures capture the construct of industry knowledge or some other associated 
characteristic(s). After controlling for firm-specific characteristics using a matched-pair sample, 
Minutti-Meza (2013) finds no differences in audit quality between specialist and non-specialist 
auditors. While Minutti-Meza maintains that industry-specific knowledge is still important for 
auditors to possess, he speculates that extant measures of industry specialization are not distinct 
from client characteristics.  
In a recent working paper, Gaver and Utke (2014) expand upon Minutti-Meza’s (2013) findings 
by examining how long an auditor has been an industry specialist. Gaver and Utke (2014) find 
that industry expertise is positively associated with audit quality, but only for auditors who have 
been industry experts for more than one year. Perhaps more importantly, their results hold even 
after utilizing a matched-pair sample similar to Minutti-Meza’s (2013), indicating that the 
consideration of prior industry experience may capture the construct of industry expertise more 
effectively than traditional measures. 
2 Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Quality 
One of the two prominent lines of audit industry specialization research examines the association 
between industry specialist auditors and audit quality. This line of research is motivated by the 
notion that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audits because they possess greater 
levels of industry knowledge than non-specialist auditors (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Relevant 
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literature in this area examines a number of different measures of audit and financial reporting 
quality.  
One of the most commonly used proxies for audit quality in industry specialization research is 
discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow et al. 1995). Early 
research in this area finds that industry expertise is negatively associated with clients’ use of 
discretionary accruals (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Kwon et al. 2007). More recently, 
Mitra and Hossain (2010) find that clients with identified internal control weaknesses under SOX 
Section 404 tend to have higher levels of discretionary accruals. However, the use of industry 
specialist auditors appeared to reduce the occurrence of discretionary accruals for these firms. 
Cahan et al. (2011) obtain results consistent with previous findings regarding the association 
between auditor industry expertise and discretionary accruals, but note that discretionary accruals 
appear to increase with the number of clients that an auditor audits within an industry. 
In addition to discretionary accruals, a few studies examine the propensity to issue going concern 
opinions as an additional measure of audit quality. Lim and Tan (2008) note that the propensity to 
issue going concern opinions is generally higher for clients that obtain non-audit services from 
industry specialists (versus those that engage non-specialists). Similarly, Reichelt and Wang 
(2010) find that auditors that are both national and city level industry specialist auditors have a 
greater propensity to issue going concern opinions to their clients; while their clients tend to have 
lower levels of discretionary accruals. Bills et al. (2015) observe that industry specialist auditors 
operating in more homogenous industries tend to have lower audit fees relative to other industry 
specialists, but that their propensity to issue going concern opinions and clients’ levels of 
discretionary accruals are not substantially different from other industry specialists. On the other 
hand, Minutti-Meza (2013) concludes that the propensity to issue going concern opinions and 
clients’ levels of discretionary accruals are not significantly different for specialist and non-
specialist auditors when utilizing a matched-pair sample to control for client characteristics. 
14 
 
A few industry specialization studies examine properties of analyst forecasts as a way of 
evaluating audit quality. Based on the premise that auditor industry specializations reduces 
earnings management by constraining the use of discretionary accruals, these studies assert that 
actual and forecasted earnings should be less consistent with one another when a client employs 
an industry specialist auditor. Lim and Tan (2008) and Reichelt and Wang (2010) both find that 
clients of industry specialists have a lower propensity to meet analyst forecasts; while Payne 
(2008) observes that analysts’ forecast errors are higher for clients of industry specialist auditors, 
and that these clients are less likely to just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. However, Behn et al. 
(2008) examine the properties of analysts’ forecasts by positing that higher quality financial 
information should improve the quality of analysts’ forecasts. They find that auditor industry 
specialization is associated with greater forecast accuracy and reduced forecast dispersion.6 
Another measure of audit quality that is utilized in industry specialization research is the 
occurrence of accounting restatements. This literature assumes that higher quality audits constrain 
clients’ material errors and misstatements. Hence, higher quality audits are associated with fewer 
(or no) restatements. Consistent with this premise, Romanus et al. (2008) find that audit industry 
specialization is negatively associated with the likelihood of client restatements and that 
switching from a non-specialist (specialist) auditor to a specialist (non-specialist) auditor 
increases (decreases) the likelihood of restatement. Stanley and DeZoort (2007) examine 
restatements in the context of auditor tenure and find that the likelihood of restatement is 
negatively associated with the length of auditor tenure. The authors further examine the tenure-
restatement association and found that the use of an industry specialist auditor appears to reduce 
the likelihood of restatement for short-tenure engagements. Chin and Chi (2009) also find that 
                                                           
6
 It is worth noting that Lim and Tan (2008), Payne (2008), and Reichelt and Wang (2010) all utilized a 
market share measure of auditor industry specialization; while Behn et al. (2008) utilized a portfolio 
measure. It is possible that the difference in findings between these studies is due to the fact that their 
measures of industry specialization captured different constructs; or, at least, different aspects of industry 
expertise. 
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clients audited by industry specialist auditors are less likely to have accounting restatements, but 
this association appears to be driven by industry expertise at the partner level rather than the firm 
level. 
Industry specialization studies employ other various proxies for audit quality. Audit quality 
provided by industry specialist auditors appears to improve the contemporaneous association 
between earning and returns, otherwise known as the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
(Balsam et al. 2003; Kwon et al. 2007). Clients of industry specialist auditors also appear to 
recognize losses in a timelier manner (Krishnan 2005; Lim and Tan 2009). Dunn and Mayhew 
(2004) observe that auditor industry specialization appears to improve the quality of client 
disclosures. Finally, Almutairi et al. (2009) find that clients of specialist auditors tend to have less 
information asymmetry (proxied by bid-ask spread) than clients of non-specialist auditors. 
3 Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Fees 
The other prominent line of industry specialization research deals with the association between 
industry expertise and audit fees. Studies in this area continue to examine whether industry 
expertise is associated with audit fee premiums, discounts, or neither. Craswell et al. (1995) 
provide some of the earliest evidence in this area; indicating that industry specialist auditors 
demand audit fee premiums. Subsequent research dissects these findings to determine what 
additional characteristics (if any) drive this premium. Ferguson et al. (2003) and Francis et al. 
(2005) find that auditors demand premiums when they are industry market leaders at both the city 
and national (or “joint”) level. However, Basioudis and Francis (2007) find that only city level 
expertise appears to matter for determination of the audit fee premium for a sample of UK firms. 
Numan and Willekens (2012) find similar results; noting that audit fees are increasing in an 
auditor’s city level portfolio share within its client’s industry.  However, a few studies call into 
question whether these observed fee premiums are the result of industry expertise. Ferguson et al. 
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(2006) find that overall city leaders may demand small fee premiums regardless of whether or not 
they are city, national, or joint industry leaders. More recently, Choi et al. (2010) provide 
evidence that office size is a critical determinant of audit fee premiums. 
Still other studies examine other possible explanations for the association between industry 
expertise and audit fees. Casterella et al. (2004) observe that the fee premium for industry 
specialist auditors is predicated on the level of bargaining power (represented by client size) that 
the auditor has over the client. As client size increases (i.e. auditor bargaining power decreases), 
the audit fee premium decreases. Huang et al. (2007) support these findings and note that audit 
fees for specialist auditors decrease as a client becomes increasingly large relative to the rest of its 
auditor’s clientele. Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) examine industry specialization as a mechanism 
for differentiation from other auditors. They conclude that audit fees appear to increase with the 
difference in market share between audit firms, though this does not necessarily indicate that 
industry expertise is the basis for the fee premium. Zerni (2012) expands upon these findings, 
suggesting that clients may view firm- and partner-level industry expertise as differentiation 
strategies, and that these strategies are associated with fee premiums. 
However, not all of the studies in this area find an audit fee premium associated with industry 
specialization. Neither Palmrose (1986) nor Menon and Williams (2001) are able to find a 
significant association between industry specialization and audit fees. Pearson and Trompeter 
(1994) also note the lack of an association between industry specialization and audit fees, but 
observe that audit fees are lower in more concentrated industries. While DeFond et al. (2000) find 
an association between industry specialization and audit fees, they are quick to note that this 
association only exists for “brand name” (i.e. Big 6) industry specialist auditors; and that non-Big 
6 accounting firms who are industry specialist auditors do not appear to demand a fee premium. 
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Other studies state that the fee premium for industry specialist auditors disappears when 
subsequent conditions and considerations are taken into account. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) 
examine a sample of Big 6/Big 5 firms from the mid-1990’s and remark that the fee premium 
observed in Craswell et al. (1995) does not appear to exist following the merger of the Big 6 into 
the Big 5. More recently, Goodwin and Wu (2013) discover that, after controlling for partner-
level expertise within industry specialist firms, the fee premiums for national and city level 
specialists are no longer present. 
A few studies present evidence that indicates auditor industry specialization may actually reduce 
audit fees. In their study, Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) note that clients who changed to an 
auditor with greater industry expertise than the predecessor auditor appear to pay lower audit 
fees. However, Ettredge and Greenberg attribute a portion of this observation to the “low balling” 
phenomenon, where auditors discount the price of audit service in the early years of an 
engagement in an effort to attract new clients (DeAngelo 1981b).  
Deis and Giroux (1996) examine a sample of working papers for Texas Independent School 
District audits during 1983 and 1984. Using number of clients audited as their market share 
metric, they find that overall audit fees and hours are lower for market leaders, but audit quality is 
actually higher. Similar to Ettredge and Greenberg (1990), the authors attribute their findings in 
part to low balling of first-year audits. However, these findings are also consistent with Pearson 
and Trompeter (1994), in that audit clients may realize lower audit fees in more concentrated 
industries. Fung et al. (2012) extend this line of research by examining how industry scale – 
measured as the number of clients an auditor audits within an industry – influences the 
association between industry specialization and audit fees. They find that the clients of industry 
specialists with a large number of clients in an industry can benefit from scale discounts in audit 
fees due to auditor industry experience. These results are corroborated by recent studies in this 
area (Audousset-Coulier et al. 2013; Cahan et al. 2013). However, Cahan et al. (2011) find that 
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overall audit quality of industry specialists appears to decrease as the number of industry clients 
audited increases.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The studies of audit industry specialization discussed previously generally assume that auditors’ 
market and portfolio shares stay relatively stable over time; particularly for large auditors (Cahan 
et al. 2011; DeFond and Zhang 2014). As such, they do not consider the effect of prior audit 
industry experience in their predicted associations. If industry knowledge is acquired over time, 
however, then prior industry experience may be associated with current period audit quality and 
audit fees. 
For my first hypothesis, I consider the role that prior industry experience plays in the quality of 
audits provided and the pricing of these audits. Studies that examine contemporaneous 
associations find that industry specialization appears to improve audit quality (Balsam et al. 2003; 
Kwon et al. 2007; Reichelt and Wang 2010). More importantly, though, Gaver and Utke (2014) 
find only auditors that are industry specialists for more than one year appear to provide higher 
levels of audit quality. The findings from Gaver and Utke (2014) agree with what we know about 
the “learning curve” from auditor tenure research (Brooks et al. 2011; Brooks et al. 2013).  
Learning curve theory suggests that, as good and service providers (in this case, auditors) 
improve their skills and processes, they realize greater returns due to increases in productivity; 
due in large part to the overall increase in providers’ knowledge gained over this time (Yelle 
1979; Henderson 1984).  Prior research in manufacturing (Adler and Clark 1991), chemical 
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processing (Lieberman 1984), and medical procedures (Moore and Bennett 1995; Schauer et al. 
2003) finds that individuals and companies with greater experience in their fields tend to be more 
productive and have lower error rates than their peers. With regard to this study, the learning 
curve implies that a positive association should exist between prior industry experience and audit 
quality. 
However, prior studies do not explicitly measure prior industry experience on a continuous basis. 
Accordingly, it is not clear what to expect when an auditor is highly experienced with regard to 
audit quality.  While the assumption may be more experience is better, it is also possible that 
auditors with prior industry experience may realize diminishing returns on audit quality over time 
due to lack of innovation, complacency, and even auditor-client bonding (Abernathy and Wayne 
1974; Brooks et al. 2011).  It is feasible that, over a long enough time frame, the association 
between prior industry expertise and audit quality is negative for highly experienced industry 
specialist auditors. 
While I do not dismiss the possibility of decreasing returns on audit quality for industry specialist 
auditors, I maintain the premise that audit quality is increasing in prior industry experience:7  
H1a: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert is 
positively associated with the audit quality provided by an auditor. 
For audit fees, this intuition is less apparent. Since there are no prior studies that consider prior 
industry experience with regard to audit pricing, the expectation of how prior industry experience 
is associated with audit fees is unclear. On one hand, prior research suggests that larger, more 
established auditors can demand higher audit fees (Craswell et al. 1995; DeFond et al. 2000). To 
the extent that prior industry experience reflects overall experience, it might be reasonable to 
                                                           
7
 I address the possibility of decreasing returns on audit quality for industry specialist auditors by 
incorporating a quadratic measure of prior industry experience in my model. If audit quality is increasing in 
the short-term and decreasing in the long-term of industry experience, it should be captured by this 
measure. 
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expect that prior industry experience is associated with higher audit fees. On the other hand, 
previous research also finds that auditors with significant industry presence – particularly auditors 
with a large number of clients within an industry and auditors working in more homogeneous 
industries – can pass on the benefits of the knowledge and efficiency from their expertise through 
lower audit fees to their clients (Cahan et al. 2011; Bills et al. 2015). The economies of scale 
argument speculates that some auditors obtain market leadership in an industry by auditing a 
large number of clients within the industry, and that the clients of these auditors pay lower audit 
fees as a result. 
I consider the potential effects of industry specialization economies of scale on audit quality and 
audit fees in my subsequent hypotheses. Thus, I predict that, absent any other considerations, 
audit fees are increasing in prior industry experience: 
H1b: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert is 
positively associated with the audit fees charged by an auditor. 
For my remaining hypotheses, I examine how audit quality and fees across different types of 
industries vary with the level of prior industry experience. Specifically, I consider characteristics 
of the auditors, clients, and existing accounting guidance for certain industries. My second 
hypothesis looks at the association between the number of clients that an industry specialist audits 
within an industry and audit quality (audit fees). As mentioned in my first hypothesis, prior 
research examines how some auditors are market leaders by virtue of auditing a large number of 
clients within an industry. While these studies primarily focus on how economies of scale can 
affect audit pricing of industry specialists, there is also some concern regarding audit quality. 
Cahan et al. (2011) find that audit quality of industry specialist auditors decreases as the number 
of clients that they audit increases. With regard to prior industry experience, this raises some 
interesting questions. On one hand, the findings of Cahan et al. suggest that the association 
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between prior industry experience and audit quality may be less positive for auditors that audit a 
large number of clients due to the variation in the audits that they perform. On the other hand, 
increased industry exposure due to a significant number of clients in an industry could 
conceivably be a source of competitive advantage over time. Although the requirement of having 
to perform a number of different procedures may hinder audit quality in the short-run, these 
auditors may be better equipped to handle unique issues due to the diversity of their prior 
experience. 
Regardless of whether the number of clients audited within an industry is beneficial or 
detrimental with respect to audit quality, it stands to reason that auditors with prior industry 
experience should still provide higher audit quality. Because of this, I predict that the association 
between audit quality the number of clients is higher for clients of auditors with prior industry 
experience: 
H2a: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert for is 
positively associated with the audit quality provided by an auditor for clients of auditors 
with a large number of industry clients. 
The consideration of prior industry experience provides some interesting tension with regard to 
how the number of audit clients within an industry may influence audit fees. While the literature 
is generally conclusive that audit fees are decreasing as the number of industry specialist clients is 
increasing, it is possible that possessing this industry expertise over time provides a different 
result. The fee savings derived from an auditor’s economies of scale in an industry stand at odds 
to the fee premiums that the auditor may be able to demand for being a long-term industry expert. 
Of course, as I postulate with regard to audit quality, audit fees should remain positively 
associated with prior industry expertise. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the association between 
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audit quality and the number of industry clients is higher for clients of auditors with prior industry 
experience: 
H2b: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert is 
positively associated with the audit fees charged by an auditor for clients of auditors with 
a large number of industry clients. 
My third hypothesis tests how audit quality (audit fees) varies with the level of homogeneity 
between the firms in the industry. Cairney and Young (2006) define industry homogeneity as the 
degree to which firms in a given industry display similar characteristics. Firms in more 
homogeneous industries are going to be more similar in operations and structure. To that end, the 
ease with which client-acquired knowledge can transfer to other clients in the same industry is 
facilitated by how similar or dissimilar these firms are. Cairney and Young find that auditors tend 
to specialize in industries where the homogeneity of their member firms is greater. 
There is a conundrum regarding how industry homogeneity might affect the association between 
prior industry experience and audit quality. Since the industry-specific skills and knowledge 
gained in homogeneous industries is easier to transfer between clients, long-term exposure to an 
industry may result in greater overall industry knowledge. This, in turn, may translate into 
improvements in the quality of industry client audits. Of course, this also assumes that similarity 
between clients in an industry is beneficial with regard to auditor knowledge. It is also possible 
that exposure to proprietary knowledge of a client is beneficial to an auditor and its other industry 
clients because the auditor can apply the experiences from different settings to different 
engagements. In this case, industry homogeneity might actually impair the quality of industry 
client audits due to the lack of variance in these audits. However, the findings of Cairney and 
Young suggest that auditors choose to specialize in more homogenous industries due in some part 
to the ease with which industry-specific knowledge can be transferred between clients. Thus, I 
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predict that audit quality is higher in homogenous industries for clients of auditors with prior 
industry experience: 
H3a: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert for is 
positively associated with the audit quality provided by an auditor for clients in more 
homogenous industries. 
Bills et al. (2015) find that auditors operating in more homogenous industries benefit from cost 
efficiencies, which is passed down to the clients in the form of reduced audit fees. To the extent 
that auditors prefer to specialize in more homogenous industries, overall audit fees may be lower 
in more homogenous industries. That said, if an auditor is recognized as an authority within a 
particular industry due to its work with particular clients in the industry, then it is possible that the 
auditor can demand higher fees for its work. While audit fees should be comparatively lower for 
auditors in more homogenous industries, I predict that auditors with prior industry experience 
should be able to demand higher audit fees in these industries: 
H3b: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert is 
positively associated with the audit fees charged by an auditor for clients in more 
homogenous industries. 
My final hypothesis examines how differences in the complexity of accounting across industries 
are associated with audit quality (audit fees). In a recent working paper, Francis et al. (2013) 
inspects differences of accounting across industries based on whether the AICPA has issued 
accounting guidance for an industry. They put forward that industries with specific AICPA 
accounting guidance possess greater accounting complexity than other industries. I examine these 
accounting complexities in the context of prior auditor industry experience. 
With regard to audit quality, it may be that prior industry experience matters more when an 
industry is characterized by greater accounting complexity. If audits within a particular industry 
25 
 
require more detailed and non-traditional testing procedures, then auditors with experience in 
these procedures will probably provide better services than auditors that are less familiar with 
these procedures. That said, it is not clear if long-term exposure to these industry accounting 
complexities makes a difference in the performance of an audit. In an experimental setting, 
Arnold et al. (2000) find that experienced auditors appear to be subject to the same professional 
judgment biases as their less-experienced counterparts when performing highly complex tasks. 
These findings suggest that accounting complexities may, to some degree, reduce the 
improvements in decision making achieved through prior experience. Additionally, it is possible 
that industry-specific guidance may act as a substitute for industry experience. While prior 
industry experience is still associated with improved audit quality, the benefits of prior industry 
experience matter less in industries with accounting guidance. To that end, I hypothesize that 
prior industry experience probably matters less in industries with AICPA accounting guidance 
with regard to audit quality: 
H4a: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert for is 
negatively associated with the audit quality provided by an auditor for clients in 
industries with greater accounting complexity. 
The effect of accounting complexities on audit fees is somewhat less clear. The traditional audit 
pricing model is a function of auditor effort and risk (Simunic 1980). It can be assumed that 
accounting complexities in an industry affect both of these. If the AICPA issues guidance on a 
particular industry, then an auditor must expend additional effort to become familiar with this 
guidance. If an auditor fails to do so, then it is subject to the threat of additional litigation due to a 
potential lack of adequacy in its accounting procedures. In other words, accounting complexities 
should increase auditor effort and litigation risk, so they also probably increase audit fees. To the 
degree that auditors with prior industry expertise charge higher audit fees, these auditors may 
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charge incrementally higher audit fees when they have to adjust for increased levels of effort and 
risk. 
However, it is also possible that auditor experience within an industry might actually reduce the 
audit fees associated with industry accounting complexity. Auditors that are experienced with 
industry accounting complexities may not need to increase fees to compensate for increased effort 
and risk. Bills et al. (2015) find that industry specialist auditors operating in more homogenous 
industries with greater accounting complexity appear to charge lower audit fees than non-
specialist auditors in these industries. These findings suggest that industry specialist auditors are 
better suited to deal with unique accounting issues within the industry; and do not need to charge 
higher fees to do so.  
While both arguments are reasonable, I believe that the former is more likely than the latter. I 
predict audit fees for clients of auditors with prior industry experience will be higher in industries 
where the AICPA has issued specific accounting guidance: 
H4b: The number of consecutive years that an auditor has been an industry expert is 
positively associated with the audit fees charged by an auditor for clients in industries 
with greater accounting complexity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
1 Industry Specialization Measurement 
To evaluate industry specialization within the context of prior research, I measure auditor market 
and portfolio shares at both the national and city level (Ferguson et al. 2003). While there are 
numerous established measures of industry specialization in the extant literature (Audousset-
Coulier et al. 2013), I use the following two definitions for my research: 
1) An auditor is considered to be a national (city) industry specialist if its annual market 
share is at least 30% (50%) of the national (city) market in its two-digit SIC category 
(Reichelt and Wang 2010; Minutti-Meza 2013); 
2) An auditor is considered to be a national (city) industry specialist if its annual share in a 
two-digit SIC category is one of the top three for the auditor across all industries in its 
portfolio (Krishnan 2003; Knechel et al. 2007). 
I measure auditor market share as the proportion of total assets audited by an auditor within an 
industry to the total assets of all firms operating within the industry. I measure auditor portfolio 
share as the proportion of total assets audited by an auditor within an industry to the total assets 
audited by an auditor across all industries. To develop my measures of prior industry experience,  
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I sum the number of consecutive years than an auditor has been a market or portfolio leader 
within a given industry. 
2 Sample Selection 
I use data for U.S. firms from the Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual and Audit 
Analytics databases to measure auditor market and portfolio shares at the national and city levels. 
I also obtain additional auditor and client data from these databases.8   The testing sample begins 
in 2003 following the commencement of the financial reporting provisions under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.9   To have a sufficient basis of measurement for my measure of industry 
specialization, I measure market and portfolio shares for all audit firms starting in 1993; when the 
Big 6 audit firms began restructuring along industry lines (Greene and Barrett 1994). The 
definitions for all of the variables that I use in my study are provided in the appendix. 
3 Audit Quality Tests 
I measure audit quality using the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals measure based on 
the modified Jones (1991) model from Kothari et al. (2005): 
 TACCit = β0 (1 / Ait-1) + β1 ∆REVit + β2 PPEit + β3 ROAit-1 + εit           (1) 
where, for company i in year t, TACCit is total accruals (net income before continuing operations 
minus cash flows from operations), scaled by total assets at the end of the previous year. ∆REVit 
is the change in revenue from the prior year, scaled by total assets at the end of the previous year. 
PPEit is gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by total assets at the end of the previous 
                                                           
8
 In order to perform some of my additional analysis, I also obtain analyst data from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) for the sample period. 
9
 The period for the testing sample in each test varies based on data requirements and availability. As 
previously mentioned, the national level audit quality tests take place from 2003 to 2013. Due to business 
segment data only becoming available in Compustat starting from 2007, the national level audit fee tests 
take place from 2007 to 2013. Finally, the MSA data needed to construct the city level measures of industry 
specialization are only widely available starting from 2000. Due to my self-imposed requirement for ten 
years of leading data for the construction of my prior industry experience measures, the city level tests for 
both audit quality and audit fees are restricted to the period from 2010 to 2013. 
29 
 
year. Finally, ROAit-1 is the return on assets (net income divided by average total assets) for the 
previous year. I estimate equation (1) annually by industry (based on two-digit SIC category). I 
require at least ten observations for each industry-year. DACCit is my measure of discretionary 
accruals; and is estimated as the negative of the absolute value of the residual (εit) from equation 
(1).10 
Discretionary accruals is one of the most commonly used measures of financial reporting quality 
(Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005); and, more specifically, audit quality (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). The intuition behind discretionary accruals as a metric for audit quality is that client 
earnings management decreases as audit quality increases. Thus, audit quality is deemed to be 
higher as discretionary accruals approach zero (Bartov et al. 2000). 
To test whether auditors’ prior industry experience is associated with the quality of the audits 
they provide, I estimate the following regression model based on Reichelt and Wang (2010): 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit  
+ β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit + β9 ALTMANit  
+ β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit  
+ β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi + β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit         (2) 
 
The dependent variable, DACCit, is the negative of the absolute value of the residual from 
equation (1).  My primary variable of interest, PRIOR_EXPit, represents one of two proxies for 
prior industry experience. My first proxy (MKTCONSECit) is the number of consecutive years 
that client i’s auditor has been a market leader within the client’s industry. The second proxy 
(PORTCONSECit) is the number of consecutive years that client i’s auditor has maintained a 
portfolio share within the client’s industry that is among the top three portfolio shares across all 
industries for the auditor. While my measures allow for the consideration of prior experience in 
the consideration of industry specialization, it is possible that the associations between my 
                                                           
10
 I use the negative of the absolute value of discretionary accruals so that it is increasing in audit quality. 
30 
 
measures and my dependent variables are not strictly linear. In other words, there may be 
diminishing returns on auditor expertise over time. To address this concern, I estimate my 
measures in two ways. First, I perform logarithmic transformations of my measures to alleviate 
linearity concerns. Second, I estimate quadratic versions of my models with squared value of my 
measures. An advantage of this method is that it allows for the determination of the “optimal” 
level of industry experience with respect to audit quality (Brooks et al. 2011; Brooks et al. 
2013).11 
In addition to my measures of prior industry experience, I also include measures of current period 
industry expertise (CURR_ISPEC) in my models. MKTLEADERit is an indicator variable with a 
value of “1” if the auditor is the current market leader within company i’s industry, and “0” 
otherwise.  PORTLEADERit is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if the auditor’s annual 
portfolio share within company i’s industry is one of the top three portfolio shares across all 
industries for the auditor. I consider these contemporaneous measures of industry specialization 
to determine whether my measures of prior industry experience contain any additional relevant 
information beyond what is already provided by these traditional measures. 
The next eleven variables in equation (2) represent control variables from prior studies of industry 
specialization and audit quality. SIZEit is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the 
end of the year. CFOit is cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets at the end of the 
previous year. STDEARNit is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items for the 
past four years. LEVit is total long-term debt divided by total assets. LOSSit is an indicator variable 
with a value of “1” is net income is negative, and “0” otherwise. MBit is the market-to-book ratio 
of equity value. ALTMANit is Altman’s (1983) financial distress score (Z-score). TACCit-1 is total 
                                                           
11
 To determine the point in time where industry expertise is maximized with respect to audit quality, I 
calculate the first-order condition for equation (2) with respect to prior industry experience.  This 
calculation assumes that a quadratic model is properly specified for the association between audit quality 
and prior industry experience. 
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accruals from the prior year, scaled by total assets at the end of the previous year. GROWTHit is 
the percentage of sales growth from the prior period. BIG4it is an indicator variable with a value 
of “1” if the company’s auditor is a Big 4 accounting firm, and “0” otherwise. TENUREit is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years that the company has retained the same auditor.  
The final three variables are measures of auditor, client and accounting complexity characteristics 
across industries. NUMCLIENTSit is the natural logarithm of the number of clients that company 
i’s auditor audits within the company’s industry. MOXi is based on the industry homogeneity 
measure from Cairney and Young (2006), measured as the mean of the correlation coefficients of 
the percentage change in operating expenses for all companies in company i’s industry. 
COMPLEXi is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if the AICPA has issued specific 
accounting guidance for company i’s industry, and “0” otherwise. 
To test H1a, I measure the correlation between my dependent variable, DACCit, and my measures 
of prior industry experience (PRIOR_EXP) in β2. I predict that the coefficient on β2 for both 
MKTCONSECit and PORTCONSECit will be positive. For H2a, I interact my PRIOR_EXP 
variables with the number of clients audited within an industry (NUMCLIENTSit) in β14. 
Consistent with the prior research indicating that audit quality varies inversely with the number of 
clients (Cahan et al. 2011), I predict that the coefficient on NUMCLIENTSit will be negative, but 
that the coefficient on the interaction will be positive. For H3a, I interact my PRIOR_EXP 
variables with the industry homogeneity measure (MOXi) in β15. Based on the assumption that 
industry specific knowledge should be more readily transferable between audit clients in more 
homogenous industries, I predict the coefficients on both MOXi and the interaction will be 
positive. Finally, for H4a, I interact my PRIOR_EXP variables with the accounting complexity 
measure (COMPLEXi) in β16. Presumably, improved accounting guidance should improve the 
quality of audits in complex industries. However, it is likely that this guidance matters less for 
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clients of auditors with prior industry experience. Therefore, I expect to see a positive coefficient 
on COMPLEXi and a negative coefficient on the interaction. 
For the remaining variables in equation (2), prior research suggests that discretionary accruals are 
generally lower for companies that engage industry specialist auditors (MKTLEADERit and 
PORTLEADERit), large companies (SIZEit), companies with greater cash flows from operations 
(CFOit), companies with greater leverage (LEVit), and companies that engage Big 4 accounting 
firms (BIG4it). Accordingly, I predict positive signs on the coefficients for each of these variables. 
Prior research also suggests that discretionary accruals are generally higher for companies with 
greater earnings volatility (STDEARNit), companies with substantial prior period accruals 
(TACCit-1), and companies with substantial growth opportunities (MBit and GROWTHit). 
Accordingly, I predict negative signs on the coefficients for each of these variables.12  Prior 
research on discretionary accruals is inconclusive regarding companies with current period losses 
(LOSSit), companies with high bankruptcy risks (ALTMANit), and companies with long-tenured 
auditors (TENUREit). Accordingly, I make no prediction regarding the signs on the coefficients 
for these variables. 
4 Audit Fee Tests 
Despite earlier research that indicates that industry specialist auditors may charge lower audit fees 
due to economies of scale (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Deis and Giroux 1996), recent industry 
specialization literature is of the general consensus that industry specialist auditors demand higher 
audit fees than non-specialists (Basioudis and Francis 2007; Numan and Willekens 2012; Zerni 
2012). While some studies have asserted that this fee premium is contingent on characteristics of 
                                                           
12
 Because I take the negative of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the predicted sign on the 
coefficient for TACCit-1 will be swapped from the expectation. In other words, I expect a negative 
association between current period discretionary accruals and prior period total accruals, but a positive 
coefficient on TACCit-1. 
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the clients (Cahan et al. 2011), audit firms (Goodwin and Wu 2013), and industry (Bills et al. 
2015), industry specialization should be associated with higher audit fees, all other things equal. 
In an effort to control for the aforementioned client, auditor, and industry characteristics, I 
estimate the following audit fee regression model based on Francis et al. (2005): 
FEESit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 ASSETSit + β4 BUSSEGit  
+ β5 CATAit + β6 QUICKit + β7 LEVit + β8 ROAit + β9 FOREIGNit + β10 GCit  
+ β11 YEit + β12 LOSSit + β13 FIRSTYRit + β14 BIG4it + β15 NUMCLIENTSit  
+ β16 MOXi + β17 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit           (3) 
 
The dependent variable, FEESit, is the natural logarithm of total audit fees for client i in year t. 
The variables on β3 through β14 in equation (3) represent control variables from prior industry 
specialization studies on audit fees. ASSETSit is the natural logarithm of total assets. BUSSEGit is 
the natural logarithm of the number of the company’s business and geographic segments. CATAit 
is the ratio of current assets to total assets. QUICKit is the ratio of quick assets (current assets less 
inventories) to current liabilities. FOREIGNit is the ratio of foreign revenues to total company 
revenues. GCit is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if the auditor issues a going concern 
opinion, and “0” otherwise. YEit is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if the company has a 
non-December 31st year-end, and “0” otherwise. FIRSTYRit is an indicator variable with a value 
of “1” if the current year is the first year that the auditor has audited the company, and “0” 
otherwise. The remaining variables are as defined above. 
To test H1b, I measure the correlation between my dependent variable, FEESit, and my measures 
of industry specialization (PRIOR_EXP) in β2. I predict that the coefficient on β2 for both 
MKTCONSECit and PORTCONSECit will be positive. For H2b, I interact my PRIOR_EXP 
variables with the number of clients audited within an industry (NUMCLIENTSit) in β15. For H3b, 
I interact my PRIOR_EXP variables with the industry homogeneity measure (MOXi) in β16. These 
two hypotheses reflect the economies of scale argument in prior industry specialization literature. 
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Prior research suggests that auditors pass on cost efficiencies to their clients from auditing a large 
number of clients or operating in more homogenous industries (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 
2012; Bills et al. 2015). Consistent with the findings in prior studies, I predict negative 
coefficients on both NUMCLIENTSit and MOXi. However, I predict that the benefits derived from 
utilizing an auditor with prior industry experience will be reflected by positive coefficients on the 
prior industry experience interactions with number of clients and industry homogeneity. Finally, 
for H4b, I interact my PRIOR_EXP variables with the accounting complexity measure 
(COMPLEXi) in β17. It stands to reason that audits in more complex industries with greater 
accounting guidance are more costly. Assuming that auditors with prior industry experience are 
more knowledgeable at performing audits in industries with specific accounting guidance, I 
expect to see positive coefficients on both COMPLEXi and the interaction between prior industry 
experience and accounting complexity. 
For the remaining variables in equation (3), prior research suggests that companies tend to pay 
higher audit fees when they engage a Big 4 auditor (BIG4it) or industry specialist auditor 
(MKTLEADERit and PORTLEADERit), when companies are larger (ASSETSit) or have more 
extensive operations (BUSSEGit and FOREIGNit), and when companies have identifiable risk 
factors; such as higher levels of current assets (CATAit) and debt (LEVit), or current period 
performance issues (GCit and LOSSit). Accordingly, I predict positive signs on the coefficients for 
each of these variables. Prior research suggests that companies tend to pay lower audit fees when 
they have stronger operating performance (ROAit), fewer liquidity issues (QUICKit), operate on 
non-calendar years (YEit), or engage new auditors (FIRSTYRit). Accordingly, I predict negative 
signs on the coefficients for each of these variables. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. To eliminate the 
effect of outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The means 
and medians for the dependent variables – ABSDACCit and FEESit – and control variables are 
reasonably consistent with the values presented in recent industry specialization studies (Reichelt 
and Wang 2010; Minutti-Meza 2013). The means for the national level industry specialization 
reveal that 29% of auditors are classified as industry specialists using the market share measure, 
and 15% of auditors using the portfolio share measure. The means for national level prior 
industry experience reveal that, on average, auditors’ consecutive years of industry expertise are 
2.17 using the market share measure and 1.24 years using the portfolio share measure.  
The city level measures of industry specialization have slightly larger means. Around 30% of 
auditors would be classified as industry specialists using the market share measure, and 18% 
using the portfolio share measure. Given that the prior industry experience values are derived 
from these industry specialization measures, it is readily apparent that the city level prior industry 
experience measures are also larger than the national level measures. On average, auditors have 
2.93 consecutive years of industry expertise using the market share measure and 1.91 years using  
  
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Dependent Variables             
ABSDACCit 38,365  -0.09402 -0.04478 0.32306 -0.09526 -0.01913 
FEESit 25,998  13.84223 13.86425 1.26841 13.08220 14.62330 
Variables of Interest - National             
MKTLEADERit 38,365  0.29107 0.00000 0.45426 0.00000 1.00000 
PORTLEADERit 38,365  0.15585 0.00000 0.36271 0.00000 0.00000 
MKTCONSECit 38,365  2.16888 0.00000 4.32951 0.00000 2.00000 
PORTCONSECit 38,365  1.24082 0.00000 3.74755 0.00000 0.00000 
Variables of Interest - City             
MKTLEADERit 10,995  0.29841 0.00000 0.45758 0.00000 1.00000 
PORTLEADERit 10,995  0.18490 0.00000 0.38824 0.00000 0.00000 
MKTCONSECit 10,995  2.93097 0.00000 5.41861 0.00000 4.00000 
PORTCONSECit 10,995  1.91405 0.00000 5.18076 0.00000 0.00000 
Industry Characteristic Variables           
NUMCLENTSit 38,365  3.39794 3.55535 1.25006 2.60000 4.50000 
MOXi 38,365  0.17419 0.14200 0.10807 0.10000 0.20000 
COMPLEXi 38,365  0.27473 0.00000 0.44638 0.00000 1.00000 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Control Variables             
SIZEit 38,365  6.04509 6.03727 2.21638 4.57800 7.52200 
CFOit 38,365  0.05864 0.08770 0.30114 0.02842 0.14499 
STDEARNit 38,365  103.03029 24.08480 221.28452 7.55910 88.42000 
LEVit 38,365  0.19115 0.13376 0.28129 0.00072 0.28972 
LOSSit 38,365  0.31469 0.00000 0.46440 0.00000 1.00000 
MBit 38,365  1.98651 1.31009 39.41442 0.75539 2.23059 
ALTMANit 38,365  2.17893 2.39627 12.61942 1.09998 4.07631 
TACCit-1 38,365  -0.08040 -0.05958 0.36724 -0.11109 -0.02260 
GROWTHit 38,365  0.40371 0.07662 20.69015 -0.01937 0.20923 
BIG4it 38,365  0.86636 1.00000 0.34027 1.00000 1.00000 
TENUREit 38,365  2.01968 2.07944 0.82605 1.39000 2.64000 
ASSETSit 25,998  6.67306 6.63893 2.07477 5.22830 8.09336 
BUSSEGit 25,998  2.14780 2.19723 0.88955 1.60944 2.77259 
CATAit 25,998  0.45226 0.44037 0.26204 0.22983 0.65881 
QUICKit 25,998  -13.06488 1.39330 382.75679 0.89649 2.33581 
ROAit 25,998  -0.01585 0.02841 0.29165 -0.02468 0.07382 
FOREIGNit 25,998  0.26090 0.15815 0.27809 0.00000 0.52200 
GCit 25,998  0.03631 0.00000 0.18707 0.00000 0.00000 
YEit 25,998  0.73579 1.00000 0.44092 0.00000 1.00000 
FIRSTYRit 25,998  0.05912 0.00000 0.23585 0.00000 0.00000 
  See Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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the portfolio share measure. It seems reasonable to assume that becoming an industry expert at 
the city level would be comparatively easier than being an industry expert at the national level. 
Accordingly, the larger overall means for industry specialization and prior industry experience at 
the city level seem reasonable. 
2 Audit Quality Tests 
2.1 National Level Audit Quality Tests 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of my audit quality hypotheses for the market and portfolio 
measures of industry specialization, respectively, at the national level. These regressions test the 
association between audit quality and industry specialization based on 38,365 available firm-year 
observations from 2003 to 2013. Industry specialization is evaluated using traditional market and 
portfolio measures alongside the prior industry experience measures constructed from these 
traditional measures (discussed in Chapter IV, Section 1 above). I also include interactions with 
industry characteristic variables to examine how the association between audit quality and prior 
industry experience varies with these characteristics. 
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 2 present the results of the tests on H1a for the market share 
measures of industry specialization and prior industry experience. Column 1 presents the results 
for the audit quality regression using only the traditional market share measure of industry 
specialization (MKTLEADERit). Consistent with prior studies, I find that industry specialization is 
positively associated with audit quality (t-statistic = 3.72). Column 2 represents the same 
regression, but using the prior industry experience measure (ln(MKTCONSECit)) in place of the 
traditional measure. I find similar results using this measure, with a positive and significant 
coefficient on my measure of prior industry experience (t-statistic = 4.11). This result suggests 
that the prior industry experience measure captures the same type of information represented by 
the market share measure of industry specialization. However, there is a question of whether the  
  
TABLE 2 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market Share 
 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit + β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit  
+ β9 ALTMANit + β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit + β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi  
+ β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
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TABLE 2 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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prior industry experience measure provides any additional information above and beyond 
industry specialization. Column 3 addresses this question by estimating the regression with both 
the market share industry specialization and prior industry experience measures. While prior 
industry experience remains positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.20), the coefficient on 
industry specialization is no longer significant (t-statistic = -0.83). While the market share 
measures of industry specialization and prior industry experience do appear to capture similar 
aspects of information, it appears that the prior industry experience measure provides 
incrementally more information about the audit quality provided by industry experts. Column 4 
tests the assertion of decreasing returns on industry experience by re-estimating a quadratic 
regression using regular and squared measures of prior industry experience (MKTCONSECit and 
MKTCONSECit2). The coefficients on both measures are significant, but in opposite directions (t-
statistic = 5.11 and t-statistic = -5.29, respectively). This result suggests that the benefits of 
industry experience with respect to audit quality decrease over time. Solving for the first-order 
condition of the coefficients on prior industry experience, I find that the optimal level of industry 
experience with respect to audit quality is 8.75 years.13 
Columns 5 through 8 of Table 2 present the results of my industry characteristics hypotheses on 
audit quality. Column 5 examines H2a on the number of clients audited by an auditor within an 
industry (NUMCLIENTSit). While the association between audit quality and number of clients is 
consistently negative in all regressions, the interaction between prior industry experience and 
number of clients is positive (t-statistic = 3.97). The interpretation of this result is that reduced 
audit quality due to an auditor’s overexposure within an industry (i.e. a large number of industry 
                                                           
13
 I solve for the first-order condition using the estimate from Brooks et al. (2011): 
 
where α1 is the coefficient on the measure of prior industry experience (MKTCONSECit or 
PORTCONSECit), and α2 is the coefficient on the squared measure of prior industry experience 
(MKTCONSEC2it or PORTCONSEC2it). 
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clients) may be reduced when an auditor has previous experience within the industry. Column 6 
looks at H3a and how the homogeneity of firms within an industry (MOXi) is related to audit 
quality. While the coefficients for both prior industry experience and industry homogeneity are 
generally positive across the regressions, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and 
insignificant (t-statistic = -0.23). This suggests that while prior industry experience appears to 
improve audit quality, there does not appear to be an incremental improvement for industry 
expert auditors in homogenous industries. Column 7 tests H4a on accounting complexity 
(COMPLEXi) based on the existence of AICPA industry guidance. The interaction between prior 
industry experience and accounting complexity is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.02). 
This finding may imply that the prior industry experience is provides less benefits with respect to 
audit quality in industries where specific accounting guidance exists. Column 8 presents the 
results of the regression with all interacted variables. The coefficients for all interacted variables 
are fairly consistent with the results from the prior regressions. 
Table 3 conducts the same array of tests using the portfolio share measures of industry 
specialization and prior industry experience, and the results are generally consistent with the 
results using the market share measures. Columns 1 and 2 represent Equation (2) regressions 
using industry specialization (PORTLEADERit) and prior industry experience 
(ln(PORTCONSECit)), respectively. While the association between audit quality and industry 
specialization is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.87), the association between audit quality 
and prior industry experience is a bit stronger (t-statistic = 3.27). Furthermore, the coefficient on 
prior industry experience remains positive and significant after adding industry specialization to 
the regression (t-statistic = 2.04). Once again, this result suggests that the measure of prior 
industry experience may contain incrementally more information about auditors’ capabilities with 
regard to the quality of services that they provide. Column 4 rounds out the portfolio measure 
tests on H1a by testing a quadratic estimate of the regression. The coefficients on the regular and  
  
 
TABLE 3 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Portfolio Share 
 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit + β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit  
+ β9 ALTMANit + β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit + β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi  
+ β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
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TABLE 3 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Portfolio Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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squared measures of prior industry experience (PORTCONSECit and PORTCONSECit2) remain 
positive and negative, respectively; and both are significant (t-statistic = 3.70 and t-statistic = -
2.33, respectively). Solving for the first-order condition of the regression, the optimal level of 
industry experience is 12.25 years. 
Columns 5 through 8 of Table 3 present the results for the remaining audit quality hypotheses 
using the portfolio share measure of prior industry experience. Column 5 presents the results of 
the tests on H2a. Once again, the interaction between prior industry experience and number of 
industry clients is positive and significant (t-statistic = 7.31) despite the coefficient on number of 
clients being negative in all eight regressions. To the extent that audit quality is reduced as the 
number of industry clients for an auditor increases, it appears that prior industry experience may 
attenuate this association to some degree. The results for the tests on H3a portfolio share measure 
of prior industry experience (presented in Column 6) differ substantially from those using the 
market share measure. The coefficient on the interaction between prior industry experience and 
industry homogeneity is positive and significant (t-statistic = 4.15), suggesting that prior industry 
experience using the portfolio approach is associated with greater audit quality in industries 
where the member firms have similar operations. On the other hand, the results in Column 7 for 
the tests on H4a do not provide conclusive results regarding the association between audit quality 
and prior industry experience in industries with greater accounting complexity (t-statistic = 0.16). 
This does not suggest that prior industry experience isn’t beneficial in industries with more 
complex accounting requirements. Rather, there is no discernible difference in the level of audit 
quality provided by industry experts from other industries. Finally, Column 8 presents the results 
of the regression containing interactions for all three industry characteristics. While the 
coefficient on the interaction between prior industry experience and accounting complexity 
becomes positive and significant in this regression (t-statistic = 2.10), the results for the 
remaining interactions are consistent with the individual interaction regressions. 
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The results of the tests for both measures of prior industry experience suggest that prior industry 
experience is associated with higher audit quality, at least at the national level. Despite the fact 
that the market share and portfolio share measures appear to capture different aspects of industry 
experience, the results for the tests on H1a are consistent in the finding that prior industry 
experience appears to lead to higher quality audits; and that these measures of experience provide 
information above and beyond traditional industry specialization measures. The results for the 
tests on H2a were also fairly consistent for both measures, suggesting that industry experience 
mitigates reductions in audit quality for auditors with a large number of clients within an industry. 
There is also some evidence to support H3a and H4a. However, the results for the tests on these 
hypotheses differed between the two measures of prior industry experience. 
2.2 City Level Audit Quality Tests 
Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for the tests of the audit quality hypotheses at the city level. 
The testing sample for these analyses is reduced to 9,033 firm-year observations, primarily due to 
the sample being restricted to the period from 2010 to 2013. Similar to the national level tests in 
Chapter V, Section 2.1, I evaluate prior industry experience using market share and portfolio 
share measures; and I interact these measures with the industry characteristic variables. 
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 4 present the results for the market share measures of industry 
specialization and prior industry experience. The results in Column 1 are consistent with the 
national level tests and with prior research. Auditor industry specialization at the city level is 
positively and significantly associated with audit quality (t-statistic = 2.97). However, the 
findings for prior industry experience are substantially different using a city level measure. The 
coefficient on prior industry experience in Column 2 is negative and insignificant (t-statistic = -
0.73); suggesting that the duration of industry experience does not influence the quality of an 
audit. The results of the regression in Column 3 including both the industry specialization and  
  
TABLE 4 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market Share 
 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit + β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit  
+ β9 ALTMANit + β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit + β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi  
+ β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
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TABLE 4 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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prior industry experience measures are consistent with this result. The coefficient on the industry 
specialization measure remains positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.95) and the coefficient on 
the prior industry experience measure remains negative and insignificant (t-statistic = -0.87). The 
results of the quadratic regression in Column 4 do imply decreasing returns on industry 
experience with regard to audit quality. However, neither the regular nor the squared measure 
coefficients are significant (t-statistic = 1.12 and t-statistic = -1.44, respectively). Taken together 
with the national level findings, these results indicate that prior industry experience is only 
relevant to audit quality at the national level. While industry specialization still appears to 
improve audit quality, the duration of prior industry experience does not appear relevant at the 
city level. 
Columns 5 through 8 present the results of the remaining hypotheses using the city level market 
share measure of prior industry experience. The interaction between prior industry experience and 
number of industry clients in Column 5 is positive but insignificant (t-statistic = 1.32), suggesting 
that the negative association between audit quality and number of clients does not vary based on 
an auditor’s industry experience. However, there is a significant interaction between prior 
industry experience and industry homogeneity in Column 6 (t-statistic = -2.52). Curiously, the 
coefficient on the interaction is negative; implying that audit quality in more homogenous 
industries is actually reduced for clients of auditors with prior industry experience. This result is 
somewhat surprising and difficult to interpret. While it is reasonable that prior experience may 
not improve overall audit quality, it is difficult to fathom any setting where experience would 
reduce audit quality. The results in Column 7 show that the interaction between prior industry 
experience and industry accounting complexity is positive but insignificant (t-statistic = 1.36). 
This result is more consistent with the explanation that prior industry experience does not 
improve audit quality (at least how prior industry experience is measured in these regressions). 
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Column 8 contains the result of all three interactions within the same regression. The results are 
consistent with those of the previous regressions. 
The results for the tests using the portfolio measure of prior industry experience in Table 5 are 
comparable to those of the market share measure. Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 present the 
tests on H1a using the city level portfolio measure. Column 1 provides evidence that industry 
specialization remains positive and significantly associated with audit quality (t-statistic = 2.39). 
However, the coefficient on prior industry specialization is negative and not significantly 
associated with audit quality in Column 2 (t-statistic = -1.05). When industry specialization and 
prior industry experience are tested jointly, the coefficient on industry specialization remains 
positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.45) while the coefficient on prior industry experience 
remains negative and insignificant (t-statistic = -1.24). In the quadratic regression estimation in 
Colum 4, neither the regular or squared measure are significant (t-statistic = 0.46 and t-statistic = 
-0.88, respectively). These results reinforce the findings from the city level market share tests – 
prior industry experience does not appear to influence overall audit quality at the city level. 
The results of the tests on the remaining hypotheses in Columns 5 through 8 of Table 5 are fairly 
similar to the city level market share tests. The associations between audit quality and the 
industry characteristic variables are generally significant and in the predicted directions for the 
eight regressions. However, none of the interactions with prior industry experience provide a 
significant result. Aside from the lack of overall significance of prior industry experience at the 
city level, none of the results in these industry settings provide any evidence of prior industry 
experience having any bearing in these settings. 
The major takeaway from the city level audit quality tests is that prior industry experience does 
not appear to be a major factor at the city level. The results in Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 4 and 5 
provide evidence that industry specialization and prior industry experience represent different  
  
TABLE 5 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Portfolio Share 
 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit + β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit  
+ β9 ALTMANit + β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit + β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi  
+ β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
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TABLE 5 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Portfolio Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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aspects of industry expertise, since the industry specialization regressions provided markedly 
different results from the prior industry experience regressions. However, it is unclear why 
industry specialization appears to be associated with audit quality while prior industry experience 
does not. The finding that prior industry experience is associated with audit quality at the national 
level (even moreso than industry specialization) raises some interesting questions. One possible 
explanation is that industry expertise is more relevant at the national level, while client-specific 
expertise is more relevant at the city level. However, it is not certain whether this explanation is 
consistent with these findings given that industry specialization is still strongly associated with 
audit quality at the city level. 
3 Audit Fee Tests 
3.1 National Level Audit Fee Tests 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the national level regressions on audit fees. These tests 
examine the association between audit fees charged to audit clients and industry expertise using 
25,998 observations during the period from 2007 to 2013. While the audit fee model differs 
substantially form the audit quality model (see Chapter IV, Section 4 above), these tests examine 
the associations with the same industry specialization, prior industry experience, and industry 
characteristics variables that were observed in the audit quality regressions. 
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 6 present the results of the audit fee regressions for H1b using the 
market share measures of industry specialization and prior industry experience. Column 1 
represents the audit fee regression with just the industry specialization variable. The positive and 
significant coefficient on industry specialization (t-statistic = 3.83) suggests that industry 
specialist auditor can demand a premium for their expertise. I note a similar result in Column 2, 
where the coefficient on prior industry experience is also positive and significant (t-statistic =  
  
TABLE 6 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market Share 
 
FEESit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 ASSETSit + β4 BUSSEGit + β5 CATAit + β6 QUICKit + β7 LEVit  
+ β8 ROAit + β9 FOREIGNit + β10 GCit + β11 YEit + β12 LOSSit + β13 FIRSTYRit + β14 BIG4it + β15 NUMCLIENTSit  
+ β16 MOXi + β17 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
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TABLE 6 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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2.79). These results support the view that auditors who attain specialization via market 
dominance can charge greater fees for audit services. However, it is not apparent whether these 
measures represent different aspects of industry expertise as it relates to audit fees. Column 3 
contains the joint regression with both industry specialization and prior industry experience. Both 
variables remain significant, but prior industry experience becomes negative (t-statistic = 3.21 
and t-statistic = -1.68, respectively). These results are somewhat difficult to interpret. While it 
appears that auditors with industry expertise can demand audit fee premiums, it seems that these 
premiums are reduced with the duration of the prior industry experience. 
Columns 4 through 7 of table 6 present the results of the audit fee regressions for the industry 
characteristics hypotheses. Column 4 examines H2b regarding how the association between audit 
fees and prior industry experience might vary based on number of industry clients. Consistent 
with recent prior research that suggests that audit fees for industry specialist auditors may 
decrease as the number of clients increases (Fung et al. 2012; Cahan et al. 2013), I find a negative 
and significant coefficient on the interaction between prior industry experience and number of 
clients (t-statistic = -3.18). This result stands at odds with my hypothesized prediction, and 
suggests that auditors with a large number of clients can realize further reductions in audit fees if 
they possess prior industry experience. The results for the test on H3b are presented in Column 5. 
I find negative and significant results on the interaction between prior industry experience and 
industry homogeneity (t-statistic = -3.07). Once again, this result goes against my hypothesized 
prediction, and suggests that prior industry experience can further reduce audit fees in industries 
with homogenous firms. Column 6 provides the results for the test of H4b. The coefficient on the 
interaction between prior industry experience and accounting complexity is negative and 
significant (t-statistic = -2.05). Based on this result, it appears that the association between audit 
fees and accounting complexity differs for clients of auditors with prior industry experience. One 
possible interpretation of this result is that auditors with prior industry experience require less 
57 
 
effort to understand and utilize AICPA industry guidance in more complex industries. Column 7 
provides the results for the regression that includes all three interactions. The result for this 
regression is consistent with the prior regressions. 
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 7 present the results of the regressions for H1b using the portfolio 
measures of industry specialization and prior industry experience. The results for these tests 
provide an interesting contrast to the results for the market share tests. The independent 
regressions in Columns 1 and 2 provide similar results in that industry specialization and prior 
industry experience are both significant. However, the sign on the coefficients is negative rather 
than positive (t-statistic = -11.22 and t-statistic = -13.31, respectively). These results support the 
view that auditors can pass on the benefits of their industry expertise to their clients in the form of 
lower audit fees. However, when both industry specialization and prior industry experience are 
considered jointly in the regression presented in Column 3, the sign on the industry specialization 
coefficient switches to positive, though both coefficients remain highly significant (t-statistic = 
3.21 and t-statistic = -8.54, respectively). This finding supports the result in the market share tests 
that auditors demand fee premiums based on their industry expertise, but that these premiums 
decrease with the duration of prior industry experience. 
Columns 4 through 7 of Table 7 present the tests on the remaining hypotheses. The results in 
Columns 4 and 5 are consistent with the market share results. The interactions in both regressions 
are negative and significant (t-statistic = -9.40 and t-statistic = -7.43, respectively), suggesting 
that prior industry experience provides additional efficiencies in these industries. In Column 6, 
however, the coefficient on the interaction between prior industry experience and accounting 
complexity is positive and significant (t-statistic = 8.25). This finding stands at odds with the 
market share tests, and indicates that auditors with prior industry experience may be able to 
demand higher audit fees in industries with specialized accounting guidance (presumably due to  
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TABLE 7 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Portfolio Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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their enhanced expertise). Column 7 contains the regression with all three interactions. The 
results in this column are consistent with the results from the prior regressions. 
The results in these two tables stand somewhat at odds with one another. The tests using the 
market share measure of prior industry experience suggest that industry expertise can increase 
audit fees, while the tests using the portfolio share measure imply the opposite. However, these 
results are not necessarily contradictory. Rather, they support the notion that these measures 
capture different aspects of industry expertise. The market share measure seems to capture auditor 
industry dominance, while the portfolio share measure appears to reflect auditor efficiencies 
within an industry. The results of the earlier audit quality tests indicate that both types of 
expertise result in improvements in overall audit quality. However, the extent to which prior 
industry experience acts as a determinant in audit pricing decisions appears to depend upon which 
measure of prior industry experience is used. 
3.2 City Level Audit Fee Tests 
Tables 8 and 9 present the results of the audit fee tests at the city level. Similar to the city level 
audit quality tests, the sample size and period is reduced due data requirements. The city level 
audit fee tests were performed on 10,995 firm-year observations during the period from 2010 to 
2013. Most of the reduction in the sample from the national level tests is due to the reduced 
sample period. 
The first three columns of Table 8 provide the results of the city level audit fee tests on H1b 
using the market share measures of industry expertise. Just as in the previous tables, Column 1 
presents the results of the regression with just the market share measure of industry 
specialization. I find a significant result for the association between audit fees and industry 
specialization (t-statistic = -3.46). However, in contrast to the national level findings, the 
coefficient is negative rather than positive; suggesting that industry specialization is associated  
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TABLE 8 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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with lower audit fees at the city level. The finding in Column 2 is somewhat different, with a 
positive and significant coefficient on prior industry experience (t-statistic = 3.52). While the 
result from Column 1 indicates that industry specialization may reduce audit fees, the result in 
Column 2 suggests that the duration of industry experience may be associated with higher audit 
fees. This result is corroborated in Column 3, as the coefficients for both variables remain 
significant and in their previously noted directions (t-statistic = -3.82 and t-statistic = 3.80). While 
these results are somewhat surprising, perhaps more surprising is the implication of the results 
when taken in unison with the city level audit quality results. I did not observe a significant 
association between audit quality and prior industry experience for either the market share 
measure (Table 4) or the portfolio share measure (Table 5). However, the association between 
audit fees and prior industry experience at the city level is positive. Taken together, these results 
imply that audit firms with prior industry experience at the city level demand a premium for their 
services despite the fact that they do not actually improve the quality of audits for their clients. 
While there may be a competing explanation for the observed positive association between audit 
fees and prior industry experience, it seems that auditors are able to command higher fees just for 
the duration of their industry experience. 
The results for the remaining hypotheses presented in Columns 4 through 7 are a bit more 
straightforward. While the associations between audit fees and each of the industry characteristic 
variables are generally significant and in the predicted direction throughout the regressions, none 
of the interactions are significant in Columns 4, 5, or 6. This result also holds when all three 
interactions are tested together in Column 7. This finding suggests that while prior industry 
experience appears to be associated with higher audit fees at the city level, this association is not 
sensitive to the nature of the industry of the audit firm’s clients. 
The results for the audit fee tests using the portfolio measures in Table 9 are similar to those using 
the market share measure. Column 1 provides the results of the regression with the portfolio share  
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TABLE 9 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Portfolio Share (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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of industry specialization. Once again, the coefficient on the industry specialization variable is 
negative and significant (t-statistic = -6.01), indicating that industry specialization is associated 
with lower audit fees. In contrast, the coefficient on the prior industry specialization variable for 
the regression in Column 2 is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.20), suggesting that audit 
fees increase with the number of years that an auditor has been an industry expert. These results 
hold when the industry specialization and prior industry experience variables are tested jointly in 
Column 3 (t-statistic = -6.50 and t-statistic = 3.74, respectively). As before, these results indicate 
that prior industry experience at the city level is taken into account in audit pricing decisions, 
despite the possibility that prior industry experience at the city level may not be relevant to the 
quality of audit services provided. 
The results displayed in Columns 4 through 7 for the prior industry experience interactions with 
the industry characteristics variables are also consistent with the earlier tests. None of the 
coefficients on the interactions are significant; neither in individual tests nor in the joint test. 
Once again, this result suggests that auditors with prior industry experience can charge higher 
levels of fees for their services, but that this association does not appear to vary significantly 
based on the type of industry. 
Obviously, the major takeaway of the city level audit fee tests is the somewhat contradictory 
finding relative to the city level audit quality tests. While it stands to reason that auditors with 
prior industry experience may charge higher fees than other auditors, this assertion is partially 
predicated on the notion that auditors with prior industry experience provide higher quality audit 
services than other auditors. The results of these tests suggest that this may not be the case. As 
previously discussed, there may be other factors driving the observed audit fee premium for 
experienced auditors. However, it is not clear what these factors might be; particularly since none 
of the tests on industry characteristics provided significant results. 
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4 Additional Analyses 
4.1 Alternative Industry Specialization Measures 
In addition to examining industry specialization at both the national and city level, several prior 
studies have developed joint measures of industry specialization for auditors that are specialists at 
both levels (Ferguson et al. 2006; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Krishnan et al. 2013). In light of the 
differences in my findings at the national and city levels, I maintain that measurement of prior 
industry experience at these levels is appropriate. However, as an additional check of my results, I 
perform additional analyses of my primary hypothesis (H1a and H1b) using measures of prior 
industry experience developed from joint market share and portfolio share measures of industry 
specialization. I measure industry specialization using an indicator variable for auditors that are 
market (portfolio) leaders at both the national and city level. Similar to my national and city level 
measures, my measure of joint prior industry experience is the sum of the number of consecutive 
years that an auditor has been a joint market (portfolio) leader. 
Table 10 presents the results for my joint measure audit quality tests. Apart from a marginally 
significant result in column 2 (t-statistic = 7.72), I do not find a significant association between 
prior industry experience and audit quality using joint measures. This result is consistent with the 
earlier city level tests on audit quality. Given that the joint measure is dependent on industry 
expertise at the city level, this result is also somewhat intuitive. This finding reinforces my 
assertion that prior industry experience is relevant to audit quality at the national level only. 
The results for my joint measure tests on audit fees are presented in Table 11. The results in 
columns 1 through 3 do not imply that there is a strong association between prior industry 
experience and audit fees using a joint market share measure of prior industry experience. 
However, I do find a significant association in columns 4 through 6 using a joint portfolio share 
measure of prior industry experience. I find that prior industry experience is negatively associated  
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TABLE 10 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – Joint Market and Portfolio Shares (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – Joint Market and Portfolio Shares 
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TABLE 11 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – Joint Market and Portfolio Shares (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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with audit fees in column 5 (t-statistic = -6.75); and that audit fee premiums for industry 
specialization are decreasing in the duration of prior industry experience in column 6 (t-statistic = 
1.94 and t-statistic = -4.55, respectively). These results are consistent with those in Table 8 using 
the national portfolio share measure. These results are also particularly surprising given that the 
results of the audit fee tests using the national and city level portfolio share measures differed 
dramatically. This result may suggest that prior industry experience at the national level is highly 
relevant to pricing decisions, and generally leads to reductions in audit fees with the duration of 
prior industry experience. 
Another potential concern of my study is the use of client assets as my metric for industry 
specialization. As mentioned earlier, prior studies have varied in their choices of how to 
effectively capture auditor industry expertise. A few studies assert that audit fees is the cleanest 
measure; and that other measures are simply proxies due to the lack of audit fee availability 
(Cairney and Young 2006; Knechel et al. 2007). Assuming that is the case, though, it is unclear 
why recent studies have deferred to using client assets when audit fee data is widely available 
(Zerni 2012; Minutti-Meza 2013). For my study, I maintain that client assets is a better metric 
simply because of the data availability issue. Audit fee data in Audit Analytics only goes back to 
2000. Given that my measure requires several prior years of data to calculate, this limits the time 
frame of useful analysis. This issue is reflected in the fact that my city level analyses – which 
require metropolitan statistical area (MSA) data from Audit Analytics – are restricted to the 
period from 2010 to 2013. 
Nevertheless, I address this possible criticism by reperforming all of my primary analyses using 
measures of prior industry experience constructed from audit fee data. Similar to my primary 
measures of prior industry experience, I construct both market share and portfolio share measures 
of industry specialization at the national and city levels. I assert that an auditor is a national (city) 
market leader if its audit fees charged within a two-digit SIC category are at least 30% (50%) of 
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all audit fees within that industry. National (city) portfolio industry specialization is measured as 
the three industries which an auditor receives the highest share of its total audit fees. My 
measures of prior industry experience are again the sum of the number of consecutive years that 
an auditor has been a market (portfolio) leader. 
Table 12 presents the results of my national level audit quality tests using my audit fee measures 
of prior industry experience. In contrast to my main results, I do not find significant results for the 
market share measure of prior industry experience in columns 1 through 4. I do, however, find 
significant results using a portfolio share measure of prior industry experience. In column 6, I 
find a significant and positive coefficient on prior industry experience (t-statistic = 1.87). 
Furthermore, I find in column 7 that, when industry specialization and prior industry experience 
are tested jointly, audit quality appears to be increasing in the duration of prior industry 
experience (t-statistic = -1.90 and t-statistic = 3.80, respectively). These results are relatively 
consistent with my main tests in Tables 2 and 3.  
Interestingly, I find similar results for my tests using city level measures of prior industry 
expertise in Table 13. In column 2, I find a positive and significant coefficient on the market 
share measure of prior industry experience (t-statistic = 2.62). However, when I consider industry 
specialization and prior industry experience jointly in column 3, the coefficient on prior industry 
experience is no longer significant (t-statistic = 1.99 and t-statistic = -0.63, respectively). My tests 
using the portfolio share measure yield a similar result in column 6 for prior industry experience 
(t-statistic = 2.62). However, in the joint test in column 7, it is instead the coefficient on industry 
specialization that loses significance while prior industry experience remains positive and 
significance (t-statistic = -0.90 and t-statistic = 1.88, respectively). 
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TABLE 12 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit 
Fees (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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TABLE 13 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit Fees 
 
DACCit = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 CFOit + β5 STDEARNit + β6 LEVit + β7 LOSSit + β8 MBit  
+ β9 ALTMANit + β10 TACCit-1 + β11 GROWTHit + β12 BIG4it + β13 TENUREit + β14 NUMCLIENTSit + β15 MOXi  
+ β16 COMPLEXi + year dummies + εit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76
 
  
TABLE 13 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit Fees 
(continued) 
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Table 14 contains the results for the audit fee tests at the national level. The results using the 
market share measure are similar to the main tests in Table 6, with a positive and significant 
coefficient on prior industry experience in column 2 (t-statistic = 4.77). However, this significant 
result disappears in column 3 when industry specialization and prior industry experience are 
considered jointly (t-statistic = 2.50 and t-statistic = -0.09, respectively). While it is not 
immediately clear what this result implies, it appears that the majority of the significance of the 
result in column 2 comes from the auditor being an industry specialist; and that the duration of 
prior industry experience does not appear to be highly relevant. With respect to the portfolio share 
measure tests in columns 4 through 6, none of the coefficients on prior industry experience load 
significantly. 
The results for the city level audit fee tests are presented in Table 15. In contrast to the national 
level tests, the tests using the market share measure in columns 1 through 3 suggest decreasing 
audit fees relative to prior industry experience. The coefficient on prior industry experience in 
column 2 is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.43), while the coefficients on industry 
specialization and prior industry experience in column 3 are both significant and in opposite 
directions (t-statistic = 3.87 and t-statistic = -4.38, respectively). These results are consistent with 
the main national level audit fee tests in Tables 6 and 7, but stand in stark contrast to the main 
city level tests in Tables 8 and 9. The portfolio share measure tests in columns 4 through 6 are 
more in line with the main city level tests. The coefficient on prior industry experience in column 
5 is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.22). However, similar to the national level tests in 
Table 15, the significance on the prior industry experience coefficient disappears when 
considered jointly with industry specialization in column 6. 
In contrast to the results using client assents, the results using audit fees to measure industry 
expertise are less clear and more difficult to interpret. None of the tests provided conclusive 
results of my primary hypothesis. In contrast to my main tests, however, I did find generally more  
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TABLE 14 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit Fees 
(continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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TABLE 15 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit Fees 
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TABLE 15 
Regressions of Audit Fees on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares of Audit Fees 
(continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
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significant results at the city level than at the national level – particularly with respect to audit 
quality. This may be an indication that audit fees as an industry specialization metric is more 
relevant at the city level, while client assets is a more appropriate metric for national level tests. 
4.2 Alternative Audit Quality Measures 
While the discretionary accruals measure from equation (1) is a widely accepted proxy for audit 
quality, it is not the only measure of audit quality used in industry specialization research. To 
determine whether my results are robust to alternative measures of audit quality, I perform 
additional tests using models from recent industry specialization studies. First, I examine the 
association between prior industry experience and audit quality based on the auditor’s propensity 
to issue a going concern opinion. Based on models from prior industry specialization studies that 
utilize going concern opinions as a measure of audit quality (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Minutti-
Meza 2013), I estimate the following regression model: 
Prob (GCit=1) = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 STDEARNit  
  + β5 LEVit + β6 LOSSit + β7 MBit + β8 LITi + β9 ALTMANit + β10 TENUREit  
  + β11 ROAit + β12 TACCit-1 + β13 BIG4it + year dummies + εit         (4) 
 
The dependent variable, GC, is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if the auditor issued a 
going concern opinion for firm i in year t, and “0” otherwise. LITi is an indicator variable with a 
value of “1” if firm i operates in a highly litigious industry, and “0” otherwise. The remaining 
variables are as previously defined. Because high quality auditors are more likely to issue going 
concern opinions, I would hypothesize my measures of industry specialization and prior industry 
experience in β1 and β2 to both be positively associated with the dependent variable. 
The results of my national level analyses on equation (4) are presented in Table 16. These results 
are highly consistent with the national level audit quality tests in Tables 2 and 3. In column 2, the 
coefficient on the market share measure of prior industry experience is positive and significant  
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Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares 
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TABLE 16 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares 
(continued) 
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(Chi-Square = 10.11). When considered jointly with industry specialization in column 3, both 
coefficients remain significant. However, the coefficient on industry specialization turns negative 
(Chi-Square = 4.30) while the coefficient on prior industry experience stays positive (Chi-Square 
= 9.73). I find very similar results using the portfolio share measure of prior industry experience 
in columns 4 through 6. The coefficients on industry specialization and prior industry experience 
remain significant and in the same direction as the market share tests in all three regressions. The 
consistency in these results (along with those in the main analyses) appears to be a strong 
indication that audit quality is closely associated with the duration of prior industry experience at 
the national level. 
The results for the city level tests on audit quality in Table 17 are less consistent with the main 
results. Unlike the city level tests in Tables 4 and 5, I find a significant association between audit 
quality and prior industry experience. However, the association in these regressions is actually 
negative, suggesting that the duration of prior industry experience at the city level reduces an 
auditor’s propensity to issue going concern opinions. This result holds for both the market share 
measure (columns 1 through 3) and portfolio share measure (columns 4 through 6). The 
implications of these results suggest that auditors with prior industry experience at the city level 
may suffer from auditor-client bonding to a much greater degree than national level experts. This 
result is not particularly surprising given the lack of an observed association between prior 
industry experience and audit quality at the city level in the main analyses. Still, this finding is 
somewhat troubling, and may require further research to assess the implications. 
As an additional test of audit quality, I perform national and city level regressions on firms’ 
ability to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Much in the same way that audit quality should 
constrain earning management of discretionary accruals, audit quality may also be reflected in 
auditors’ constraint of earnings management to meet earnings targets. I estimate the following 
model based on Reichelt and Wang (2010): 
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Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares 
 
Prob (GCit=1) = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 STDEARNit + β5 LEVit + β6 LOSSit + β7 MBit  
 + β8 LITi + β9 ALTMANit + β10 TENUREit + β11 ROAit + β12 TACCit-1 + β13 BIG4it + year dummies + εit         
 
 
 
  
87
 
  
TABLE 17 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares (continued) 
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Prob (MEETit=1) = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 STDEARNit  
+ β5 LEVit + β6 LOSSit + β7 MBit + β8 LITi + β9 ALTMANit  
+ β10 TENUREit + β11 ROAit + β12 TACCit-1 + β13 BIG4it + β14 STDFORit 
+ β15 LOGESTit + year dummies + εit               (5) 
 
The dependent variable, MEETit, is an indicator variable with a value of “1” if firm i exceeded the 
mean of analysts’ forecast for year t by one cent per share or more, and “0” otherwise. STDFORit 
is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for company i in year t. LOGESTit is the 
natural logarithm of the number of analysts following company i in year t. The remaining 
variables are as previously defined. Because high quality auditors are more likely to constrain 
upward earnings, I would hypothesize my measures of industry specialization and prior industry 
experience in β1 and β2 to be negatively associated with the dependent variable. 
Table 18 contains the results of my national level tests on equation (5). Unlike my other national 
level audit quality tests, I do not find significant results for prior industry experience using the 
market share measure in columns 1 through 3. I do find a negative coefficient on prior industry 
experience for the portfolio share measure in column 5 (Chi-Square = 4.43). However, this 
significant result disappears when I consider industry specialization and prior industry experience 
jointly in column 6 (Chi-Square = 0.52 and Chi-Square = 2.40, respectively). There appears to be 
some evidence that prior industry experience constrains upward earnings at the national level. 
However, the results for these tests are far weaker than my other national level audit quality 
regressions. 
I examine equation (5) at the city level in Table 19. For both the market and portfolio share 
measures, the coefficient on prior industry experience is insignificant in all regressions. This 
finding is fairly consistent with the main audit quality analyses in Tables 4 and 5 that fail to find 
any significant associations at the city level. Taken together, these results may suggest that the 
role of constraining earnings management by industry expert auditors is fairly isolated to the  
  
TABLE 18 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares 
 
Prob (MEETit=1) = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 STDEARNit + β5 LEVit + β6 LOSSit + β7 MBit  
+ β8 LITi + β9 ALTMANit + β10 TENUREit + β11 ROAit + β12 TACCit-1 + β13 BIG4it + β14 STDFORit  
+ β15 LOGESTit + year dummies + εit                   
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TABLE 18 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – National Market and Portfolio Shares 
(continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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TABLE 19 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares 
 
Prob (MEETit=1) = β0 + β1 CURR_ISPECit + β2 PRIOR_EXPit + β3 SIZEit + β4 STDEARNit + β5 LEVit + β6 LOSSit + β7 MBit  
+ β8 LITi + β9 ALTMANit + β10 TENUREit + β11 ROAit + β12 TACCit-1 + β13 BIG4it + β14 STDFORit  
+ β15 LOGESTit + year dummies + εit                   
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TABLE 19 
Regressions of Audit Quality on Auditor Industry Specialization and Prior Industry Experience – City Market and Portfolio Shares (continued) 
 
 
  
See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively. All p-values 
are based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. All continuous variables are Winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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national level, since neither the discretionary accruals nor the analyst forecasts test provided 
significant results at the city level. 
4.3 Sample Volatility Tests 
In order to address concerns about potential volatility in my sample, I conduct several additional 
tests of my hypotheses. For the first of these, I repeat my national level tests excluding firm data 
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. 14   Given the economic environment during this period of 
recession, it is likely that several of the financial measures in my model were exogenously 
affected. Additionally, prior studies suggest that auditors responded to the recession by lowering 
audit fees to retain clients during this period (Beardsley et al. 2014; Ettredge et al. 2014). Given 
that these issues may be relevant to my results, I reperform my tests without the data from the 
recession years in the sample. In untabulated analyses, I find that my results with the sample 
excluding the recession years are quantitatively similar to my main results. 
Another potential issue exists with the presence of former clients of Andersen in the sample. 
When Andersen went out of business in 2002, its clients and staff were absorbed by other 
accounting firms. Accordingly, auditors’ levels of industry expertise may have changed 
substantially during this period. This event is one example of why contemporaneous measures of 
industry expertise may not be effective. While the absorption of Andersen clients and personnel is 
not reflected in my measures of prior industry experience, it is likely that this would bias against 
me finding results. The fact that I do find some results, then, should alleviate any concerns. 
Nevertheless, I reestimate my models with a reduced sample excluding any former clients of 
Andersen. My untabulated results are consistent with my main analyses in Tables 3 through 10. 
One final sample issue exists with the major accounting firm mergers during the 1990s. During 
the period from 1989 to 2002, the Big 8 were reduced to the Big 4 through a series of mergers 
                                                           
14
 I only repeat my national level tests because the sample period for the city level tests doesn’t begin until 
2010. 
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and breakups. Aside from the dissolution of Andersen (discussed above), the only merger large 
firm merger that occurred during my sample period was the Price Waterhouse merger with 
Coopers & Lybrand in 1998. While it is unlikely that this single merger would significantly 
influence my results, I reperform my analysis with reestimated industry expertise measures to 
reflect the merger in 1998. While it is worth noting that PriceWaterhouse Coopers became an 
expert in several industries in 1998 by virtue of this merger, my results in untabulated analysis are 
nearly identical to my main results. 
4.4 Additional Regression Results 
I perform some additional regressions to answer a few potential remaining issues. One notable 
exclusion from my main regressions is industry fixed effects. This exclusion is deliberate, and 
consistent with recent previous studies (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Cahan et al. 2013; Bills et al. 
2015). Furthermore, this exclusion is justifiable on the basis that industry characteristics are 
already measured in my models as part of my secondary hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4). However, 
I address any potential concerns regarding this exclusion by reperforming my analyses with 
industry fixed effects in the models. In untabulated results, I find results consistent with my main 
analyses in Tables 3 through 10. 
Along the same lines, there is a potential question with regard to fixed effects related to MSAs in 
the city level analyses. My city level industry specialization and prior industry experience 
measures are estimated at the MSA level, so this should preclude the need for MSA fixed effects. 
Still, I reperform my city level analyses with MSA fixed effects included in my model. My 
untabulated results for these tests are quantitatively similar to my main city level results. 
Finally, there is a question of whether clustering at the firm level is necessary for my regression 
analyses. While the same firm can represent multiple observations in my sample, each 
observation represents an independent firm-year, so it is unlikely that clustering is necessary. 
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Nevertheless, I reperform all of my tests with clustered standard errors at the firm level. While I 
do notice that most of my coefficients of interest are slightly less significant for these tests, the 
untabulated results are quantitatively similar to my main results.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines auditor industry specialization in the context of prior industry experience to 
determine if the length of time that an auditor has been an industry expert is associated with the 
quality and pricing of audit services that industry specialist auditors provide. Learning curve 
theory asserts that prior work experience is associated with greater subsequent efficiency and 
knowledge (Henderson 1984; Adler and Clark 1991). This study examines whether this 
association holds in the industry specialization setting. Specifically, I develop measures of prior 
industry experience to determine how they are associated with current period audit quality and 
audit fees. Furthermore, I perform several tests based on industry characteristics to determine 
how audit quality and audit fees vary across different types of industries, and whether prior 
industry experience mediates these associations. 
I find that, at the national level, prior industry experience is positively associated with audit 
quality for both market share and portfolio share measures of industry specialization. I also find 
some support that the quality of audit services across different types of industries is influenced by 
the duration if industry experience. At the city level, I do not find support prior industry 
experience is associated with audit quality, despite finding strong associations for current period 
measures of industry specialization. This finding suggests that prior industry experience is more 
relevant at the national level than at the city level with respect to audit quality. 
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I also find significant associations between audit fees and prior industry experience at the national 
level. However, the direction of this association depends on whether prior experience is measured 
using market share or portfolio share. Market share prior industry experience yields a positive 
association, suggesting that it represents the market dominance perspective of industry expertise. 
Portfolio share prior industry experience yields a negative association, suggesting that it 
represents the efficiency perspective of industry expertise. However, the results of the regressions 
for both measures suggest that audit fees for industry specialist auditors are decreasing in the 
duration of prior industry experience. The results on my tests on industry characteristics are also 
generally consistent in the finding that prior industry experience is associated with incrementally 
lower audit fees. Finally, my city level audit fee tests reveal a positive association with prior 
industry experience for both the market share and portfolio share measures. This finding is 
particularly interesting given the earlier finding that city level industry experience does not 
appear to improve audit quality. This result may imply that clients of auditors with prior industry 
experience are willing to pay a premium for prior industry experience despite the lack of evidence 
that prior industry experience improves audit quality. 
 This study is the first to evaluate auditor industry expertise by taking into account both 
the duration and level of prior industry experience; and opens up several opportunities for future 
research. For example, future studies might examine if low balling for first year audit 
engagements is less predominant when an auditor is already an established industry expert. This 
study could also be expanded to an international setting to examine whether auditors are more or 
less likely to possess prior industry experience in countries with weaker investor protection or 
weaker accounting and regulatory regimes. Finally, it is possible that prior industry experience is 
representative of auditor reputation and that an auditor is more likely to leave a client when it is 
already an established expert in the client’s industry. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables     
DACCit 
  
The negative of the absolute value of performance-
adjusted discretionary accruals for company i in year t 
        
FEESit 
  
The natural logarithm of total audit fees for company i in 
year t 
        
Variables of Interest (CURR_ISPEC and PRIOR_EXP)   
MKTLEADERit 
  
An indicator variable equal to "1" if company i's auditor's 
annual market share in the company's industry is at least 
30% (50%) of the national (city) market for year t, and "0" 
otherwise 
        
PORTLEADERit 
  
An indicator variable equal to "1" if company i's auditor's 
annual portfolio share in the company's industry is one of 
the top three portfolio shares for the auditor across all 
industries in year t, and "0" otherwise 
        
MKTCONSECit 
  
The number of consecutive years that company i’s auditor 
has been a market leader within the company’s industry 
        
  ln(MKTCONSECit)   The natural logarithm of the MKTCONSECit variable 
        
  MKTCONSEC2it   The squared value of the MKTCONSECit variable 
        
PORTCONSECit 
  
The number of consecutive years that company i’s auditor 
has maintained a portfolio share within the company’s 
industry that is among the top three portfolio shares across 
all industries for the auditor 
        
  ln(PORTCONSECit)   The natural logarithm of the PORTCONSECit variable 
        
  PORTCONSEC2it   The squared value of the PORTCONSECit variable 
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Variable Definitions (continued) 
Industry Characteristic Variables   
NUMCLIENTSit 
  
The natural logarithm of the number of clients that company 
i’s auditor audited within the company’s industry in year t 
        
MOXi 
  
The mean of the correlation coefficients of the percentage 
change in operating expenses for all companies in company 
i's industry 
        
COMPLEXi 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if the AICPA has 
issued specific accounting guidance for company i’s 
industry, and “0” otherwise 
        
Control Variables     
SIZEit 
  
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity for 
company i at the end of the year t 
        
CFOit 
  
Cash flows from company i's operations, scaled by total 
assets at the end of the previous year 
        
STDEARNit 
  
The standard deviation of income before extraordinary items 
for company i over the past four years 
        
LEVit 
  
Total long-term debt divided by total assets for company i in 
year t 
        
LOSSit 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” is company i's net 
income for year t is negative, and “0” otherwise 
        
MBit 
  
The market-to-book ratio of equity value for company i in 
year t 
        
ALTMANit   Altman’s (1983) Z-score for company i in year t 
        
TACCit-1 
  
Total accruals (net income before continuing operations 
minus cash flows from operations) for company i in the prior 
year, scaled by total assets for the company at the end of the 
previous year 
        
GROWTHit 
  
The percentage of company i's sales growth from the prior 
period 
        
BIG4it 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if company i’s 
auditor in year t is a Big 4 accounting firm, and “0” 
otherwise 
        
TENUREit 
  
The natural logarithm of the number of years that company i 
has retained the same auditor 
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Variable Definitions (continued) 
Control Variables (continued)   
ASSETSit   The natural logarithm of total assets for company i in year t 
        
BUSSEGit 
  
The natural logarithm of the number of company i’s business 
and geographic segments in year t 
        
CATAit 
  
The ratio of company i's current assets to total assets in year 
t 
        
QUICKit 
  
The ratio of quick assets (current assets less inventories) to 
current liabilities for company i in year t 
        
ROAit 
  
The return on assets (net income divided by average total 
assets) for company i for year t 
        
FOREIGNit 
  
The ratio of foreign revenues to total revenues for company i 
in year t 
        
GCit 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if the auditor issues 
a going concern opinion for company i in year t, and “0” 
otherwise 
        
YEit 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if company i has a 
non-December 31st year-end, and “0” otherwise 
        
FIRSTYRit 
  
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if the current year 
is the first year that the auditor has audited company i, and 
“0” otherwise 
  
      
Accruals Calculation Variables   
TACCit 
  
Total accruals (net income before continuing operations 
minus cash flows from operations) for company i in year t, 
scaled by total assets for the company at the end of the 
previous year 
        
ΔREVit 
  
The change in company i's revenue from the prior year, 
scaled by total assets at the end of the previous year 
        
PPEit 
  
Gross property, plant, and equipment for company i, scaled 
by total assets at the end of the previous year 
        
ROAit-1 
  
The return on assets (net income divided by average total 
assets) for company i for the previous year 
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Variable Definitions (continued) 
Additional Analyses Variables     
MEETit   
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if earnings exactly 
meet or beat the mean of analysts’ forecasts by one cent per 
share for company i in year t, and “0” otherwise 
        
LITi   
An indicator variable with a value of “1” if company i 
operates in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833–
2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7370), 
and “0” otherwise 
  
      
STDFORit   
The standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
company i in year t 
  
      
LOGESTit   
The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following 
company i in year t 
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